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Abstract
This dissertation aims to address the security issues of insider cyber-physical attacks and
provide a defense-in-depth attack-resilient control system approach for cyber-physical systems.
Firstly, security analysis for cyber-physical systems is investigated to identify potential risks
and potential security enhancements. Vulnerabilities of the system and existing security
solutions, including attack prevention, attack detection and attack mitigation strategies are
analyzed.
Subsequently, a methodology to analyze and mathematically characterize insider attacks is
developed. An attack pattern is introduced to represent key features in an insider cyber-physical
attack, which includes attack goals, resources, constraints, modes, as well as probable attack
paths. Patterns for such attacks are analyzed for different attack stages. Impacts and
consequences of these attacks are analyzed by using an attack tree. Stealthy conditions of
insider attacks are identified through temporal and spatial analysis, respectively.
On the defense side, a cross-layered detection scheme is developed to reveal stealthy insider
attacks, and an attack-resilient control scheme is proposed to mitigate impacts of these attacks.
The detection scheme includes a hierarchical approach by incorporating different detection
methods in multiple layers to provide a defense-in-depth detection against the attacks. A
model-based anomaly detection method is used to uncover the anomalies caused by temporal
stealthy attacks, while a data-driven clustering detection method is used to recognized
anomalies induced by spatial stealthy attacks. The attack-resilient control scheme consists of a
decision logic and multiple attack-resilient controllers. The decision logic responds to the
anomalies identified by the detection scheme and subsequently switches to suitable controllers.
These controllers are designed to respond to these attacks and mitigate or minimize their
impacts.
To validate the above methodologies, a general guideline for designing an experimental
security assessment platform has been developed in this dissertation. Furthermore, a modular
approach is proposed to design and implement a platform to simulate various insider attacks
and to evaluate corresponding defense mechanisms on a cyber-physical system. The designed
ii

platform has been implemented on a physical component based dynamic system simulator,
known as Nuclear Process Control Test Facility (NPCTF). The proposed vulnerability
assessment and security enhancement techniques have been validated under different insider
attacker scenarios.
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Chapter 1
1. Introduction
1.1 Background
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) can be essentially viewed as a physical process and its
corresponding control systems connected through some form of common communication
networks [1], as is shown in Figure 1.1. Data between the physical process and the control
system are transmitted through communication networks for monitoring and control purposes
[2]. Because the networks can also be used by potential adversaries, it opens up potential entry
points for them to tamper with the transmitted data. Adversaries might even gain access to
safety-critical system information by exploiting weaknesses of networks or communication
protocols. Due to cyber-physical interactions, malicious adversaries might manipulate the
transmitted data to disrupt the physical process through cyber means, which is referred herein
as cyber-physical attacks [3]. If these attacks are targeted to safety-critical processes, they can
cause immense damage in the physical parts of the system and even endanger human lives.
Cyber systems
(Computation and control)

Communication networks
(Data transmission)
Sensor measurements

Control commands
Physical processes

Figure 1.1 Diagram of a cyber-physical system
Cyber-physical attacks can come from either an insider threat or an external threat. The insider
threat is the most daunting challenge to handle [4], it is because that insider attackers usually
have legitimated access to the targeted resources and may even know how to carry out
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destructive actions while avoiding being detected [5]. A well-publicized insider attack is on
the Maroochy Shire Council’s sewage control system in Austria [3]. There are also many
cyber-attacks targeted on safety-critical systems that take advantage of the insider knowledge
and cause adverse effects on physical processes. Stuxnet on Siemens PLC systems by
introducing a malware capable of modifying internal commands [6]. In 2013, Havex attack
was meticulously prepared to remotely compromise the industrial control systems and caused
massive damages in safety-critical infrastructures [7]. Black energy attacked Ukrainian power
grids in 2015 by seizing control of SCADA systems to deliberately switch off substations to
cause wide-area blackouts [8].
There are two unique features commonly in these attacks:
1) All these attacks are stealthy. In all the cases, attackers are able to gain access into
the system and leverage their inside knowledge about the system to bypass the anomaly
detection schemes and achieve their attack goals without triggering any alarms [9]. Even
though there are many security measures implemented to fence off external attackers in the
cyber-physical systems, such as intrusion detection, data encryption and access control
mechanisms, they may be ineffective to insider attacks.
Therefore, it is of great significance to find security solutions that can extract the features
of insider attacks, identify system vulnerabilities related to insider attacks, and manage the
security risks respect to insider attacks.
2) All these attacks are enabled due to cyber-physical interaction. Attackers have taken
advantage of the cyber-physical interactions inside the system. They have compromised
the network and tampered the transmitted data in the cyber layer, then used the cyberphysical interdependencies to manipulate the process operation and caused severe physical
damage without being detected.
Hence, the security of cyber-physical systems requires analysis of both cyber layer and
physical process, and their interactions [10]. Methods that integrate cyber-physical security
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and control theory are needed to provide attack detection and resilient control against insider
cyber-physical attacks, which is the focus of this dissertation.

1.2 Motivations
Based on the analysis of the reported attack accidents, it is necessary to address the security
challenge of insider cyber-physical attacks against cyber-physical systems, where the attacker
can (1) tamper sensor readings or (2) manipulate control commands [11]. This kind of attacks
are referred as insider attacks in this dissertation.
Even though there are many researches on modeling and analysis methods of insider attacks,
it is still challenging to describe features of attacks mathematically because attacks usually
happen in unpredicted ways. Therefore, instead of identifying a specific model of attacks, it is
necessary to analyze the resulting impacts of insider attacks on the CPS and develop
corresponding countermeasures.
A major distinction of cyber-physical security with respect to cyber security is the cyberphysical interaction of the control system with the physical processes. Cyber-physical attacks
originate from cyber space but have impacts on the physical processes.
Traditionally, security issues of cyber-physical systems are mainly investigated from the
perspective of information security with a focus on confidentiality, availability, integrity of the
information in the cyber space [1]. While information security studies are key elements in the
cyber space, they have less consideration on the interdependencies between the physical
process and the cyber space. Moreover, such information security methods are not effective
against insider attacks and they also fail against attacks targeting directly to the physical system
dynamics. Thus, information security methods are not enough to secure cyber-physical
systems. It is required to handle the cyber-physical coupling relationships and interactions.
Therefore, one needs to consider cyber-physical interdependencies from a control system
perspective, to enhance the security of cyber-physical systems.
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For safety-critical CPS, the ultimate objective is to secure process and control mechanisms
[12]. It is motivated to develop an attack-resilient control approach that can provide attack
detection, protection and control for both cyber and physical aspects of the system. In order to
analyze the impacts of cyber-physical attacks, and to validate the implemented security
enhancement strategies, there is also a need of a security assessment platform to conduct
experimental evaluation.

1.3 Research scope
This dissertation considers the security problem of cyber-physical systems against insider
attacks from a control perspective. The focus of this work is on insider cyber-physical attacks,
whereby the attacker is assumed to be able to interrupt the communications during the data
transmission and tamper with the data of sensor measurements or control commands.
The scope and assumptions of the research are listed as follows.



The inside attacker considered has access to the system or already inside the system, can
compromise communication networks, tamper with the exchanged sensor measurements
or control commands being sent and received, and cause damages to the physical process.



Attacks are considered being stealthy for the anomaly detection scheme that only detects
if the transmitted data meets the physical laws or relationships which will not trigger an
alarm.



The attack goal is to initialize an attack in the cyber space to cause impacts and damage
on the physical process.



Attacks are assumed to happen in a single channel at a time, coordinated attacks are not
considered in this dissertation.



The supervisory station is isolated from the rest of the system and is assumed to be secure.
It contains a control system and an anomaly detection scheme.
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It is assumed that the supervisory layer is secure and could not be penetrated by the
attacker.

The focus of this dissertation is on providing security analysis on system vulnerabilities and
threats with respect to insider attacks, and designing security enhancement methods to prevent,
detect and mitigate the impacts of such attacks. This research consists of the following three
core tasks, as is shown in Figure 1.2.

Security analysis

Security enhancement

Vulnerability analysis

Attack detection

Attack analysis

Multi-layered defense

Attack impact analysis

Resilient control

Security evaluation

Figure 1.2 Research focus of the dissertation
Please note, terminologies used in the dissertation have been defined based on the industry
standards ISA/IEC-62443: Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems: Technical
Security Requirements for IACS Components [13], and related technical references.

1.4 Contributions of the dissertation
Based on the research tasks in Figure 1.2, the contributions of the dissertation can be
summarized into three main groups: (1) security analysis, (2) security enhancement, and (3)
security evaluation.

(1) Security analysis
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The contributions of this aspect are threefold.
First, potential ways of breach of security in cyber-physical systems have been investigated
and analyzed. Second, a unified formulation against insider attacks has been proposed.
Features of insider attacks are extracted using an attack pattern. Lastly, stealthy conditions of
insider attacks are identified based on a temporal and spatial analysis. Different attack
scenarios and their impacts are represented through an attack tree.
This analysis links attack threats with system vulnerabilities. The outcome of the analysis can
then be used to improve the security of CPSs against potential insider attacks. Moreover, the
dissertation has improved the existing work on attack pattern and stealthiness analysis against
insider attacks.

(2) Security enhancement
The contributions on this topic can be highlighted in the following three aspects.
First, an online cross-layered detection scheme has been designed to reveal potential anomalies
in multiple layers. The detection scheme takes a hierarchical approach by combining different
detection methods in respective layers to provide a defense-in-depth detection against attacks
of different forms. A state estimation with CUSUM based detection method and a data-driven
detection method are proposed to work together to detect stealthy attacks. The cross-layered
detection scheme is proved to be effective, as shown by examples how attack-inflicted
anomalies can be detected before the attack can cause significant impacts on the wellbeing of
the physical process.
The above cross-layered design has made notable improvements to the existing detection
techniques that merely focus on network intrusion detection or anomaly detection in physical
processes. The current design fuses data from both the cyber layer and the physical layer,
integrates them with model-based and data-driven methods to provide a stronger and more
robust defense-in-depth detection.
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Second, an attack defensive framework has been developed in this work. This framework,
combining attack prevention, anomaly detection and mitigation strategies, offers a defense-indepth protection against insider attacks to maintain the CPS in a safe state. By using the
proposed framework, system security has been enhanced as attack anomalies are detected
quickly, and the system operator can be alerted promptly to take actions and to mitigate impacts
of the attacks.
Third, this dissertation introduces an attack-resilient control scheme to mitigate effects of
attacks, which includes an attack response scheme, a decision-making scheme and a set of
switchable controllers. The attack response scheme can isolate and replace the corrupted data,
the decision-making scheme can switch in appropriate controller into the system, and the
controller can mitigate the attack and bring the system to a safe state. This work provides a
temporary solution to protect the system before more permanent solutions can be taken by
human operators to secure the system.

(3) Security evaluation
The contributions in this topic have two parts.
First, a general design methodology for developing a security assessment platform has been
developed, which provides an overview on how to develop a security platform on a cyberphysical system. Modular design makes the development and implementation flexible.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no such platforms reported in the open literature.
Second, security experimentation and associated performance evaluation techniques on a
specific cyber-physical system have been carried out. Experimental case studies have
demonstrated that the platform is capable of identifying system vulnerabilities, validating
various detection and mitigation strategies, and evaluating system security conditions and
providing insights for security enhancement.

8

1.5 Structure and organization of the dissertation
The overall framework of the dissertation is outlined in Figure 1.3.
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Hierarchical analysis
Vulnerability
Analysis
Data flow analysis
Security Analysis
(Chapter 2,3, 5)

Attack pattern

Control Systems against Insider Attacks for Cyber‐Physical Systems

Threat Analysis

Stealthiness analysis
Attack impact
analysis

Prevention

Firewall, thresholds
Rule‐based network
IDS

Security
Enhancement

Cross‐layered
Detection

Model‐based
CUSUM detection
Data‐driven
clustering detection

(Chapter 6,7)
Cross‐layered design
Reconfigurable
decision logic
Resilient Mitigation
Defense‐in‐Depth
Design

attack‐resilient
controllers

General prototype
Platform Design
Modular design

Security Evaluation
(Chapter 4, 5, 6, 7)

Specific platform on
NPCTF
Specific Design
Validation and
evaluation

Figure 1.3 Overview of the topics covered in the dissertation
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The dissertation is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 investigates the cyber-physical security issues related to insider attacks based on
existing research work and literature. Risk assessment methods including vulnerability
analysis, threat assessment and impact analysis are investigated and analyzed. Security
enhancement strategies including topics on attack prevention, attack detection, and attack
mitigation are surveyed and discussed. Meanwhile, security issues and challenges are also
analyzed.
Chapter 3 analyzes system vulnerabilities and potential insider attacks on the system. Cyberphysical interactions and attack impacts are examined in the form of an attack tree. A specific
analysis is demonstrated on a nuclear process control test facility (NPCTF).
Chapter 4 presents a modular design of an experimental security platform. It develops a general
design guideline for a cross-layered experimental security platform, and proposes a modular
approach to design and implement a platform for security tests on cyber-physical systems. This
chapter also describes the process of constructing a security platform prototype for a specific
cyber-physical environment and the way to use it for various security assessments.
Chapter 5 introduces a methodology on analysis and formulation of insider attacks through
data tampering. Attack features are characterized by an attack pattern, stealthy conditions are
analyzed, and impacts are also discussed.
Chapter 6 provides a cross-layered detection approach to detect anomalies from different layers.
It integrates network intrusion detection with physical process detection, and combines modelbased and data-driven detection algorithms to reveal various stealthy attacks.
Chapter 7 presents an attack-resilient control system design, which includes a decision-making
scheme to respond to the attacks resiliently, and an attack-resilient controller to mitigate the
impact of attacks. This chapter also presents an attack defensive framework to provide defensein-depth protection for cyber-physical systems.
Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation and provides some discussions on future work in this area.

11

Chapter 2

2

Investigation on Security of Cyber-Physical Systems
under Insider Attacks

2.1 Introduction
Security is critically important to ensure a reliable operation of cyber-physical systems. The
purpose of this chapter is to investigate techniques for security analysis and enhancement
solutions, which can provide some references and guidance as how to design defensive
strategies.
Topics covered in this chapter are summarized in Figure 2.1. These topics can be classified
into three categories: vulnerability analysis, threat assessment, and security enhancement
strategies. System vulnerabilities and features of insider threats are analyzed and surveyed.
Existing security solutions, including attack prevention, attack detection and attack mitigation
strategies are also investigated.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, system vulnerabilities
are surveyed. In Section 2.3, features of insider threats are discussed, attack models are
investigated and methods to evaluate impacts of attacks are also summarized. In Section 2.4,
a variety of security solutions including attack prevention, detection and mitigation techniques
are surveyed and compared, secure architectures are discussed to develop a defense-in-depth
control system. Finally, Section 2.5 presents some discussion and potential solutions on
security of CPSs.

2.2 Survey on vulnerability analysis related to insider attacks
Cyber-physical systems are featured as tight coupling of cyber-physical components. This
cyber-physical interaction has induced security vulnerabilities that might be exploited by
attackers. Different approaches to identify potential vulnerabilities related to insider attacks
have been studied recently.
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Figure 2.1 Techniques investigated on security analysis and enhancement
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A method based on fault tree analysis is used to identify process vulnerabilities to insider
attacks in [4]. A graph-based model is proposed to determine inherent network vulnerabilities
that could be exploited by a malicious insider in [14]. Several behavior-based models are
proposed to establish the relation between the vulnerabilities and insider attacks in [4] and [15].
An insider threat model in [16] is established to acquire cyber situational awareness. Since a
cyber-physical attack is initiated from the cyber domain, and then manifested to the physical
domain, a successful insider attacker will have to combine knowledge from both domains to
explore the vulnerabilities to inflict physical damage to the process. It is necessary to analyze
the vulnerabilities among the cyber-physical couplings and interactions. Unfortunately, the
interactions and dependencies between the cyber and physical components have not been
considered in these techniques.

2.3 Survey on threat assessment
2.3.1 Cyber-physical attacks and their characteristics
Insider attacks on cyber-physical systems can be classified by attack types, entry points and
stealthy conditions, as summarized in Figure 2.2.
Adversaries may interrupt the communication networks, tamper with the data packets being
sent to the controller or eavesdrop to gain information on the system state [17]. Thus, the type
of attacks can correspondingly be categorized into three groups: eavesdropping, denial-ofService (DoS) attacks, and deception attacks [1].
Eavesdropping attacks aim to intercept the network traffic and capture relevant information
from the network traffic for later analysis, however, this kind of attacks will not have an impact
on the physical process. DoS attacks aim to disrupt the data transmission by interrupting the
communication networks. The deception attacks can compromise the integrity of data packets
by tampering with the transmitted data between the physical layer and the cyber layer.
Deception attacks can further be classified as false-data injection attacks, replay attacks and
covert attacks. The characteristics of these attacks are described in Table 2.1.
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Figure 2.2 Classification of insider attacks on cyber-physical systems
A malicious attack could be carefully designed to compromise transmitted sensor data and
tamper with the data that is sent to the detection scheme without being detected. A
methodology is presented to generate stealthy attacks in [18]. Impacts of false-data injection
attacks are characterized as a reachable set in [19], this reachable set are compared with the
safety set of the system to evaluate the attack impacts. Detectability and identifiability of
attacks are characterized analytically using an extended observer in [20].
To study the stealthiness of an attack, a graph-based model is constructed to determine inherent
network vulnerabilities that could be exploited by a malicious insider in [21]. State-estimation
methods are used to characterize the unobservable attack in [22].
To get the maximum attack impact, an DoS attack schedule is proposed to bypass intrusion
detection mechanisms in [23]. To study the worst case that might caused by attacks, the
maximum impacts of a DoS attack is studied in [24], and the worst damage of a false-data
injection attack and the minimum number of the manipulated variables required by this kind
of attacks are studied in [25].
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Table 2.1 Insider attacks on cyber-physical systems
Attack type

Description
Compromise the system and

Eavesdropping

eavesdrop the transmitted data

Reference
[26]

Jam the networks traffic to make
Denial of Service (DoS)

the communication channels

[23] [24]

unavailable

Deception
attack

General deception

Interrupt the data transmission

attack

and inject a malicious action

False‐data injection

Modify the transmitted data in a

[19] [18] [29] [30]

attack

stealthy way

[20] [31] [25]

Replay attack

Use historical data to hide the
current malicious action

[27, 28] [26]

[32] [33‐35]

Coordinate control signals and
Covert attack

sensor measurements to hide the

[36]

attack action

2.3.2 Modeling methods for insider attacks
Attack models are used to map the insider threats to cyber-physical system vulnerabilities. In
Table 2.2, attacks are analyzed based on control-theoretic, cyber security, and hybrid
approaches separately.
Several works in this field have focused on identifying models to characterize an insider
attacker based on his/her psychological and behavioral characteristics. For example, an attack
model is defined by attacker’s knowledge, disclosure resources and disruption resources in
[43]. An insider deception model based on a grounded theory method is used to identify the
technical and behavioral features of insider attacks [44]. Attack vectors are identified based on
the policy violations in [45]. A framework based on insider attacker-related behaviors and
symptoms is proposed to describe insider attackers based on socio-economic aspects rather
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than the system architecture have been discussed in [46]. A game-theoretic model is proposed
to model and analyze the insider threats in [47].

Table 2.2 Impact analysis of insider attacks from different perspectives
Approaches

Control-theoretic

Cyber security
Hybrid approaches

Proposed techniques

Reference

Attack models, stealthy condition of attacks

[32]

Physical watermarking detection to replay attacks

[37]

Moving target detection

[38]

Characterization of robust estimation and control

[39]

Sequence-aware intrusion detection system

[40]

Big data analytics for attacks on PLC

[41]

Attack graph generation

[42]

Most of these modeling work have been focused on modeling attacker’s behavior, there is
fewer considerations which assess the insider threat in a control-theoretical manner. System
vulnerabilities exploited by the insider attacks, physical impacts of the attacks, and system
resources used by an attacker need to be studied in order to provide indications for a secure
control system design.
Furthermore, it is of the utmost importance to study the dynamics of the physical process under
attacks, and to capture features caused by such attacks. An insider pattern is defined by its type,
capabilities, objective, and strategy in [48]. A model based on a semi-Markov chain is
presented to predict possible decisions by attackers and to evaluate the system security in [49].
An attack space has been defined according to the system knowledge, disclosure information,
and disrupted resources in [32]. Some illustrative examples have been presented to show how
an attack signal is injected into a state estimator in a stealthy way in [50, 51]. These research
are focused on analysis of how insiders might attack from the perspective of an attacker’s
behavior [4]. However, to secure the physical process, it is necessary to analyze the impact of
the attacks on the physical process from a system point of view, to identify anomalies that an
attack might manifest on the system. Since attacks are initiated from the cyber domain, and
then manifested to the physical domain, a successful insider attacker will have to combine
knowledge from both domains to explore the vulnerabilities to inflict physical damage to the

17

process. It is necessary to analyze the vulnerabilities among the cyber-physical couplings and
interactions. Unfortunately, the interactions and dependencies between the cyber and physical
components have not been considered in these techniques.
In order to capture the impacts of an insider attacker, a tuple has been used based on
organization structure [52], to trace a sequence of attack actions leading up to safety violations.
Attack models are represented using dataflow-based directed graphs in [53]. Similarly, attack
trees [54], attack graphs [55], integrated fault-attack trees [56], and attack pattern trees [57]
are all used to characterize insider attacks and their attack paths and steps. These researches
help to identify system vulnerabilities under insider attacks.

2.3.3 Techniques for stealthy condition analysis
The ultimate goal of an insider attacker is to drive some critical system variables into unsafe
states without triggering any alarms by keeping the attack stealthy or delaying any detection
or responses. A well-planned attacker might bypass the anomaly detection system or hide
his/her actions for a long period. An adversary is capable to tamper with the sensor data
without raising an alarm, some examples are presented in [28, 58] [59] and [60]. Works on
stealthy condition analysis are summarized in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3 Review of techniques for stealthy condition analysis
Type of attacks

Description of stealthy condition

Reference

Replay

Bypass the anomaly detector

[32] [33] [62]

False data injection attack

Tamper the anomaly detector

[51] [58] [65]

Zero-dynamics attack
Covert attack
Surge attack, bias attack,
and geometric attack

Modify control commands to hide attacker’s
actions

[66]

Bypass traditional anomaly detectors

[96]

Bypass traditional anomaly detectors

[27]

So far as keeping a cyber-physical attack stealthy, there are two main approaches: the first is
temporal stealth attack to tamper the anomaly detection mechanism by injecting deceptive data,
such as a deception attack [61], or a false-data injection attack [58]. The second approach is
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spatial stealth attack to conceal malicious attacks using healthy historical data, such as replay
attacks in [62]. A methodology is presented to study stealthy attacks in [63]. Detectability and
identifiability of a stealthy attack are defined in [64]. However, none of these studies have
taken into account essential features of an insider attacker. As a result, many assumptions made
in these works may not be directly applicable for attacks committed by an insider. Therefore,
common characteristic of attacks and their impacts on cyber-physical systems need to be
analyzed.

2.3.4 Attack impact analysis
Impacts of attacks can illustrate the security status of a cyber-physical system and provide
insights on designing detection and mitigation schemes. Research work on impact analysis is
summarized in Table 2.4. A game theory method is used to analyze the cyber threats within a
cyber-physical system in [67]. Impacts of attacks on critical networks are evaluated in [68] and
[69] to increase the resilience of cyber-physical systems. In order to analyze how an cyber
attack can affect the physical process, a threat model is proposed in [70], possible
consequences of DoS attacks and deception attacks are assessed. Impacts of combination
attacks are considered in [71], and an aspect-oriented method is proposed to model these
impacts in [72]. To better understand the attack impacts timely, an algorithm is presented in
[73] to predict the possible consequences by attacks. In order to develop the characteristics of
attacks, an attack description language is proposed in [74], however, this method can only be
applied to known attacks.
The above-mentioned methods mainly focus on analysis of insider attacks in the cyber domain.
By combining information from both cyber and physical domains, it is more likely that a
pattern from a cyber-physical attack can be revealed, and subsequent impacts can be alleviated.
Therefore, to secure cyber-physical systems, system vulnerabilities should be analyzed in a
general and systematic way. It is necessary to assess impacts of attacks on physical process,
and analyze the interactions of the cyber system with the physical process.
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Table 2.4 A literature review on methods for impact analysis
Methods

References

Game theory method to analyze cyber-physical attacks

[67]

Analysis of attack impacts on networks

[68]

Cause-consequence relationship analysis

[69]

Impact analysis on DoS and integrity attacks

[70]

Statistical analysis for various attack scenarios

[71]

Aspect-oriented risk assessment

[72]

Predictive risk assessment method

[73]

Qualitative and quantitative analysis for cyber-physical attacks

[74]

2.4 Investigation of security enhancement solutions
Reviews on security solutions include prevention, detection and mitigation. Attack prevention
is defined as the first barrier against insider attacks starting from the entry point. Attack
detection techniques need to be built for all layers of a cyber-physical system, and mitigation
mechanisms are initiated to respond and mitigate the impacts of the attacks.

2.4.1 Attack prevention and detection
Attack detection is to identify anomalies of the system. Attack detection techniques can be
classified into two groups: (1) passive detection techniques to prevent attacks, and (2) active
detection techniques to identify the anomalies of attacks. Active detection techniques can be
designed as data-based methods or model-based methods. Related techniques are investigated
in Table 2.5.
Passive detection techniques mainly focus on protecting the information security include
firewalls, demilitarized zones and network intrusion detections to prevent intrusions and
misuse of access privileges. Guidelines are proposed in [75] to design specific firewalls and
demilitarized zones to prevent the intrusions from the external network to the physical process.
Intrusion detection methods are proposed in [76] and [77] to monitor the network traffics.
These passive techniques can help to prevent intrusions form external or local networks.
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However, they might be ineffective for sophisticated attacks and insider attacks. it is necessary
to employ defense-in-depth detection strategies to provide a layered detection.
Active anomaly detection techniques can be classified into data-based and model-based
techniques. Data-based approaches does not require system and attack models, they detect the
anomalies through machine-learning [80] and pattern recognition techniques [78, 79] for
analyzing hidden patterns in the observed training data set. Model-based approaches are based
on the parametric models under normal operations and under different attack scenarios. The
detection decision rules are made on the residuals between system observations and modelbased system outputs, such as game theory [85], physical watermarking [90] and state
estimation techniques [91-100]. However, the residuals are often not obvious due to the model
uncertainties and noises, and the model might be utilized to bypass the detection schemes by
sophisticated attackers. It is required to consider the cumulative effects of insider attacks and
the constraints of system models when designing a detection framework.

Table 2.5 A literature review of prevention and detection methods
Attack detection

Techniques
Firewalls

Attack prevention

Data-based
detection

Model-based
detection

and

References
demilitarized

zones

[75]

Network intrusion detection

[76] [77]

Clustering

[78, 79]

Machine learning

[80]

Data fusion

[81] [82] [83]

Graph theoretic methods

[84]

Game theory

[85]

Gaussian authentication

[86] [87]

Fast greedy algorithm

[88]

Physical watermarking

[37, 89] [90]

State estimation

[91-94] [95] [96] [97] [98] [99]
[100]

Rule-based detection

[51]

Hybrid detection

[40, 42]
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2.4.2 Mitigation methods
Once safety violations or anomalies are detected, corresponding mitigation actions will be
triggered. The objective of attack mitigation is to minizine impacts of the attack and recover
the system operation as much as possible.
There are two types of mitigation strategies: (1) proactive methods that mitigate the system
prior to the detection of an attack and (2) reactive mitigation that takes actions only when an
attack has been detected. This chapter investigates the related work of proactive methods,
which is summarized in Table 2.6.

Table 2.6 Review on mitigation methods
Techniques

Approaches
Dynamic zero-sum game theory and a jamming

Game-theory control

strategy
A receding horizon Stackelberg control law
Attack-resilient control with a distributed control
methodology

Resilient control

Optimal control

Networked control

[101]
[102]
[103,104,105]

Attack-resilient control through a time-trigger strategy

[106]

Attack-resilient control with a Kalman state estimator

[107]

A multiple-task robust controller

[108]

Attack-resilient control using a hybrid model

[109]

A two-stage attack-resilient control system

[110]

Reconfiguration control for safety violations

[111]

An optimal decoder to minimize the attack effects

[112]

Design of an optimal estimator to minimize the worstcase impact
Horizon linear–quadratic control

Predictive control

References

A predictive control system to compensate for adverse
effects
Contingency analysis to detect malicious control
commands

[113]
[114]
[115]
[116]
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These methods include game-theory methods, resilient control method, optimal control method,
predictive method, and network control method. A dynamic zero-sum equilibrium control
strategy is proposed to defend DoS attacks in [101] and a receding horizon control law against
replay attacks is presented in [102]. Attack-resilient control designs are studied based on
various strategies, such as distributed controllers in [103, 104, 105], multi-agent time-trigger
strategies in [106], and state estimation through Kalman filter in [107]. Hybrid controllers are
designed in [108] and [109] to defend stealthy attacks, a two-stage resilient control system is
designed to respond and mitigate attack impacts. In order to minimize the attack impacts,
optimal control is considered in [112], [113] and [114]. In order to compensate the adverse
effects of attacks, a predictive control system is demonstrated in [115], and a contingency
analysis is given in [116].
However, most of these mitigation methods are designed based on known attacks, since the
attacks are unknown and hard to predict, some of the impacts of attacks may not be acquired
and mitigated effectively. A resilient defensive framework should be performed in multiple
layers to secure the cyber-physical system.

2.4.3 Security architecture development
A secure architecture is also necessary to ensure the security of a cyber-physical system.
Security enhancement solutions should be considered from the cyber layer to physical layer.
Table 2.7 summarizes the design of security architectures from different perspectives. A data
fusion-based framework is proposed in [117] in order to enhance the robustness of networks.
The cyber-physical interactions of a resilient cyber-physical system architecture are discussed
in [118]. A authentication architecture for a IoT system is studied to presented to enhance the
end-to-end security. A cyber-physical security architecture is proposed in [119] from an
information security perspective. A layered architecture is analyzed in [120] to improve the
security of communication protocols.
Security in one layer may not satisfy the required security requirements, hence there should be
multi-layer security solutions to secure the cyber-physical systems. A defense-in-depth
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security architecture is in need to accommodate various security solutions in multi-layer
systems. Different defense-in-depth designs for CPS are presented in Table 2.8.

Table 2.7 A literature overview of security architecture design
Proposed approach

References

A fusion-based defense mechanism

[117]

Qualitative and quantitative analysis for cyber-physical interactions

[118]

IoT-based security architecture

[119]

An information security framework

[120]

Security architectures to study security of heterogeneous protocols

[121]

Table 2.8 Defense-in-depth solutions for security enhancement
Design methods
Single-layer
solutions

Techniques

References

A comprehensive review on IDS

[122]

techniques
IDS in cyber layer

[35]

Distributed management and control

[123]

of security
A framework for attack-resilient

[124]

industrial control systems: Attack
detection and controller
Multi-layer

reconfiguration

solutions

A comprehensive analysis of security

[125]

objectives
A CPS security framework including

[126]

multiple security mechanism
A cross-layer context-aware security

[127]

framework

2.5 Discussions
This chapter has summarized the related research works to secure control of cyber-physical
systems against insider attacks. Based on the review of existing work, there are mainly two
aspects need to be studied for further research and improvements: (1) there is a need for risk
assessment methods to address the attack impacts on physical processes from a control point
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of view, provide indicators for security enhancement strategies; and (2) attack mitigation
methods may be improved when a defense-in-depth structure and multi-layer redundant design
are considered.
The remaining chapters on this dissertation will focus on these two directions to enhance the
security of the system.
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Chapter 3

3

Vulnerability Analysis under Insider Attacks

3.1 Introduction
One of the core features of cyber-physical systems is the tight cyber-physical connectivity and
interactions. Malicious adversaries might use the cyber-physical couplings to launch cyberphysical attacks on safety-critical processes and cause disruptions in operations of physical
processes. To understand insider attacks on cyber-physical systems and develop a
corresponding defensive framework, it is necessary to map out the relations from the insider
attacks to the vulnerabilities within a cyber-physical system.
There are two questions need to be answered when assessing the system security.
(1) What assets in the cyber-physical system are vulnerable to insider attacks?
This question is related to system vulnerabilities that might be taken advantage of by inside
attackers.
(2) What are the threats from insider attacks?
This question can be answered by the analysis of possible attacks, including analysis of
attack models and their impacts.
To answer these two questions, this chapter analyzes system vulnerabilities under insider
attacks.

3.2 Definition of an insider threat
An insider threat is defined by a unique set of attributes, which includes [128]:



Access: Insiders are those who have legitimate access to the targeted system or already
gain control of the system. Malicious insiders might abuse such access to the targeted

26

resources and avoid being detected by access control strategies that are designed mainly
to prevent against external intrusions [5].



Authorized resources: Insiders already have authorized resources to conduct operations
for their assigned duties, which also give them accessible to the targeted resources and
carry out destructive attacks.



Knowledge: Insiders already have certain degree of the knowledge of the targeted system
and its security countermeasures. They may even know how to exploit the system
vulnerabilities and carry out their malicious actions without being detected, which makes
detecting, mitigating, or recovering from insider attacks extremely challenging [13].

Security issues associated with insider attacks normally have two unique traits:



Cyber-physical coupling: attacks launched from cyber space can cause physical damage
in the processes.



Stealthy attacks: insiders could design their attacks in such a way to avoid being detected.

3.3 Vulnerability analysis of cyber-physical systems
Vulnerabilities are the weaknesses that an adversary could exploit and use to cause damages
to the systems [126]. Analysis of vulnerabilities can identify the potential entry points and
understand how an attacker might take advantage of the vulnerabilities to launch malicious
attacks. The vulnerabilities of cyber-physical systems can be classified into five categories
[129]:



architectural vulnerabilities;



security policy vulnerabilities;



software and hardware vulnerabilities;



communication network vulnerabilities; and
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detection and control related vulnerabilities.

In this chapter, vulnerabilities of cyber-physical systems are analyzed in two aspects:
hierarchical analysis and data flow analysis.

3.3.1 Hierarchical analysis

Physical
layer

Cyberphysical
layer

Cyber layer

A5

Supervisory
system

A3

Operator
workstation

HMI

Servers

Communication network

A4

Controllers

A1

Communication network

A6 Sensors

Physical processes A8

A2

Actuators A7

Figure 3.1 Architecture and composition of a cyber-physical system
The architecture of a typical cyber-physical system can be conceptually illustrated in Figure
3.1 in three layers: cyber layer, cyber-physical layer and physical layer [130]. The cyber layer
contains high-level human machine interface, control algorithms, information and data
processing devices. Its functions include data processing, control command generation, and
high-level process management and optimization [131]. The physical layer typically consists
of sensors, actuators, and physical processes. These elements are generally in hardware forms.
Cyber-physical layer consists of network infrastructure that facilitates data exchanges between
the cyber layer and the physical layer. Communication protocols are used to ensure smooth
cyber-physical interactions [132]. To analyze security of cyber-physical systems, Cyberphysical security, all three layers have to be involved: (1) data processing and control in the
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cyber layer, (2) data transmission in the cyber-physical layer, and (3) sensor measurements and
control commands in the physical layer.

3.3.2 Data flow analysis in a control loop
In cyber-physical systems, there are two types of data flow in a control loop: sensor data flow
and actuator data flow. In a cyber-physical system, the cyber system interacts with the physical
system by reading the sensor data and sending the control commands through cyber-physical
interactions. Sensor data flow and actuator data flow are interdependent, a change in one side
will lead to changes in the other side [10].
1) Sensor data flow. Sensor data are sensor measurements from the physical system,
compromised sensor data may mislead the controllers to make false control commands and
result in security violations at the physical system.
2) Actuator data flow. Actuator data flow are transmitted from the cyber layer to the physical
system. Such information in the cyber space can be used by attackers to cause undesired
deviation in the operation of the physical system.

3.4 Attack analysis
3.4.1 Insider attacks on cyber-physical systems
3.4.1.1 Potential entry points for insider attacks
Potential entry points of cyber-attacks are labelled as A1- A8 in Figure 3.1. The nature of these
attacks is explained in Table 3.1.
Attacks initiated from points A1, A2 and A3 target the sensor measurement data and control
commands. Under such attacks, adversaries may interrupt the communication connection,
eavesdrop to gain information on the system state, or tamper with the transmitted data packets
[17]. These intrigue activities can lead to: denial of service attacks(DoS), deception attacks,
false-data injection attacks (FDI), and replay attacks. The adversaries might conceal other
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illegitimate activities from human operators or event detection algorithms implemented in the
supervisory system. Such attacks are called stealthy attacks.
Attacks initialized at A4 and A5 can compromise the controller or the supervisory system or
alter some system configurations [17]. Attacks launched from A6, A7 and A8 can be viewed
as physical attacks.
This dissertation mainly focuses on security issues as a result of cyber-physical attacks that
tamper with the data streams to cause damages in the physical process. The attack surface is
originated from A1, A2 and A3, possible attack scenarios can be summarized in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Potential entry points for insider attacks on CPS
CPS
layers

Label

Entry points of
attacks
Communication
network

A1

between the
sensors and the
controllers

Cyber‐
physical
layer

Communication
network
A2

between the
controllers and
the actuators

Security issues

Attack scenarios

Interrupt the communication

Denial of Service

between the sensors and the

(DoS) attack

controllers;

Deception attack

Manipulate or/and eavesdrop

False‐data injection

measurement data sent to the

attack

controllers

Replay attack

Interrupt the communication

Denial of Service

between the controllers and

(DoS) attack

the actuators;

Deception attack

Manipulate or/and eavesdrop

False‐data injection

the data package sent to the

attack

actuators

Replay attack
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Communication
network
A3

between
controllers and
supervisory
systems

Interrupt the communication
between the controllers and
the supervisory systems;
Manipulate or/and eavesdrop
the data package between the
controllers and the
supervisory systems

Denial of Service
(DoS) attack
Deception attack
False‐data injection
attack
Replay attack

Interrupt normal operations of

Denial of Service

Cyber

the controlled process,

(DoS) attack

layer

manipulate the control logics

Deception attack

in the controllers, or send

False‐data injection

tampered data to the

attack

supervisory system/detection

Ladder logic

system

bombs[133]

A4

Controllers

Compromise the supervisory
A5

Supervisory

systems, change system

Malware, code or

system

configurations, or disrupt

program injection

detection systems

Physical
layer

Physical attack on physical

Direct physical

processes

attacks

A6

Physical process

A7

Sensors

Physical attack on sensors

A8

Actuators

Physical attack on actuators

Direct physical
attacks
Direct physical
attacks

3.4.1.2 Definition of a successful attack
In this dissertation, a successful attack is defined as: (1) the attack goal has been achieved;
and (2) the attack is stealthy before its goal is achieved.
Given the attack goal, the attacker utilizes available resources to carry out a sequence of
malicious actions. A successful insider attack can be marked by an action or actions that drive

31

a physical process beyond its safety limits while remaining undetected. This definition can be
used to evaluate whether the attack is successful or not.

A failed attack: The insider attack fails if it is detected before the attack causes safety issues
in process variables.

3.4.2 Attack trees
A comprehensive attack tree that integrates anti-models are constructed to show the logical
sequence of an attack. Attack tree relate the system vulnerabilities from the attacker’s entry
points in cyber layer to physical processes. Anti-goals are used to model an attacker’s
malicious intentions related to system vulnerabilities [164]. By constructing a comprehensive
attack tree, attack anti-goals and steps can be mapped to system vulnerabilities.
An attack tree is shown in Figure 3.2.

Attack Goal G
AND

Attack Sub-goal
v(5)

Attack Sub-goal
v(4)
OR

Attack Sub-goal
v(3)

Attack Sub-goal
v(2)
AND

Attack Sub-goal
v(0)

Attack Sub-goal
v(1)

Figure 3.2 An attack tree
The construction of an attack tree starts from the identification of the attack anti-goal and sub
anti-goals. The attack anti-goal, sub anti-goals, and attack steps are linked by logical
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connective functions and subsequently a tree structure is formed. The synthesis of the tree is
described graphically using connective symbols (AND, OR). The node that represents the
attack goal is referred as a root node. When an attack sub goal is broken down further, the
corresponding node is called a non-leaf node. Once an attack sub anti-goal is exhaustive, or
when it is decided not to expand the analysis further, the corresponding branch is terminated
with a leaf node.
In this chapter, an attack tree with system state and attack scenarios has been constructed to
identify the attack pattern from the cyber domain to the physical process.
Procedures to construct a comprehensive attack tree is as follows:
(1) Set attack goals and sub-goals;
(2) Design attack mode scenarios;
(3) Define the attack steps;
(4) Link the attack steps as a chain to form a complete attack path;
(5) Integrate common attack steps for different attack mode scenarios; and
(6) Construct a complete attack tree.
The attack tree is constructed from the top to the bottom, but the execution sequence of an
attack is from the bottom to the top. The attack tree results from a graph theoretic analysis of
the network, security of a network and its interaction with the physical processes can be
analyzed based on the attack tree.
The AND-OR refinement structure can be used to link sets of sub goals in an attack scenario.
Each sub-goal in the attack tree is considered to be a vulnerability point in the system, v(0) is
the entry point of an insider attack on the CPS, and G is the final attack goal.
Thus, the vulnerability vector of each path P (i ) is:
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V ( P(i))  v(0), v(1),, G

(3.1)

In order to identify the vulnerabilities, all the nodes and variables in each attack path are needed
to form a valid attack path.

3.4.2.1 Attack path identification using attack tree
Attack paths and the corresponding steps can be identified based on the attack tree from the
bottom to the top. An attack path not only reflects the cyber-physical interactions of the system,
but also reveals the attack sequence hidden within the system. Attack steps based on the
corresponding attack path can also be identified.
For rest of this chapter, a practical cyber-physical system is used to illustrate the conception.
This system is known as Nuclear Process Control Test Facility (NPCTF), as is shown in Figure
3.3.

Figure 3.3 Overview of the NPCTF
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3.5 NPCTF environment
In this dissertation, all case studies are implemented on NPCTF. As a foundation of the case
study, this chapter analyzes the vulnerabilities and potential insider attacks. For generality and
simplification, the following chapters will give brief introductions on NPCTF.

3.5.1 Cyber-physical aspects of NPCTF
NPCTF is designed as a general-purpose process control test facility, supporting research in
instrumentation and control (I&C) at the Control, Instrumentation, and Electrical Systems
(CIES) Research Laboratory at The University of Western Ontario (UWO) [134].
NPCTF is a fully operational scaled version of a physical plant, which represents the relevant
portions of a cyber-physical system. In order to provide accurate information and real-life
experimentation capabilities, this facility consists of a physical simulator to mimic the
dynamics of a nuclear power plant, real field devices placed in the physical environment, and
real programmable logic controllers (PLCs), which generate and exchange data packets via a
communication switch in the cyber layer.
To identify the vulnerabilities related to insider attacks, the environment for a cyber-physical
security platform used in the NPCTF is described as follows.

3.5.1.1 Physical Process
In NPCTF, sensor measurements and actuator signals are associated with the analog or digital
data in thermal-hydraulic processes, controllers generate actual data packets and interact with
field devices to carry out detection and control tasks. There are totally 19 AIs, 30 AOs, 8 DIs,
14 DOs and 12 control loops in the NPCTF. Detailed description of the control loops can be
found in [134].
Sensor readings and control signals are transmitted between field devices and PLC. Analog
I/O messages are in the form of 4-20 mA signals that must be converted back and forth to their
corresponding physical values.

35

Insider attacks on sensors and actuators will choose I/O messages between devices and PLC
in NPCTF as input to attacks, which are exchanged through TCP/IP packets.

3.5.1.2 Control System and Anomaly Detection System
An ABB Freelance AC700 PLC is chosen to implement the protection and control for the
NPCTF. The PLC receives measurements from the sensors and computes the corresponding
control actions. Anomaly detection system is set based on the safety limits of the physical
processes. Anomalies can be detected if a process variable exceeds the designated limits. The
Anomaly detection system is also used to detect anomalies caused by attacks on NPCTF.
The control algorithm and anomaly detection system are programmed in a Ladder logic
diagram and sequential event logic diagram, using the ABB Control Builder F. Since there
were no security checks for performing logic updates, an attacker can tamper with the sensor
readings or control signals to the actuators through this vulnerability.

3.5.1.3 Communication Network
Measurement data from the sensors and actuator data sent to the actuators are collected as (AI,
DI) and (AO, DO) and transmitted over the control network in the NPCTF. Information
between NPCTF process and the ABB PLC is communicated via a field bus, and
communication between PLC and HMI is based on TCP and UDP protocols.

3.5.2 Vulnerability analysis of NPCTF
For clarity of presentation, the heater control loop on NPCTF is selected as an example to
analyze the system vulnerabilities. The heater control loop is shown in Figure 3.4.
There are one actuator (C2) for regulation of heater power, and two sensors ( T1 , T2 ) for inlet
and outlet temperature measurement in the heater control system, respectively, as shown in
Figure 3.4. The outlet temperature T2 is regulated by the heater current C2 through a
proportional (P) controller, when the sensor readings of T2 to the PLC decreases, the current
signal C2 in the heater will increase accordingly. The anomaly detection system is designed
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according to the minimum (LL) and maximum (HH) bounds defined by the system safety limit.
The safety limit of water temperature T1 and T2 are set at 37℃, which should not be surpassed,
otherwise potential damages to the system can occur and force a system shutdown.
Supervisory station

Control communication network A3

Controller (AC700F)

T2

C2

A1 Device communication network A2
T2

Sensor

C2'
Heater

Actuators

Figure 3.4 Cyber-physical attacks on the heater control loop
ECCS (emergency core cooling system) is used as an emergency control when the system is
in an unsafe state.
The safety setting on the heater control system is given as follows: the safety boundary of T1
and T2 is set as <HH=35℃, LL=15℃>, and the set point is 37℃. The current C2 ranges from
0 to 100%.
The vulnerabilities of the heater control loop are analyzed by considering the following aspects.
1) Architectural vulnerabilities
There are three potential entry points on NPCTF for insider attacks, as listed in Figure 3.4. A1
is the entry point to the sensor communication channel from the sensor measurements to PLC.
A2 is the entry point to the control communication channel from PLC to the actuator of the
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heater. A3 is the entry point to the communication network between PLC and the supervisory
station.
2) Security policy vulnerabilities
Currently, there is only passive security policy, which is the firewalls and safety thresholds.
Attackers may take advantage to intrude the communication network and attack the heaters of
the system.
3) Software and hardware vulnerabilities
All the hardware on NPCTF have no safety and security protection. Most of the software are
open-sourced and have no access control or encryption. This vulnerability may open some
backdoors due to the lack of security policies.
4) Communication network vulnerabilities
TCP and UDP are used in the communication network between PLC and the supervisory
station, UDP protocol is vulnerable to most of the sniff tools. The attackers can compromise
the communication network and deliver the attacks into the channel.
5) Detection and control related vulnerabilities
There are only passive detection measures, such as safety limit, firewalls are used in NPCTF,
which is ineffective for insider attacks. The existing controller in the heater control loop is a
PD controller for normal operation, which cannot maintain the system performance under
various situations.
Based on the knowledge of these vulnerabilities, an attacker can take advantage of cyberphysical interactions and identified these vulnerabilities to design stealthy attacks and drive
the system into unsafe state.
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3.5.3 Insider attacks on NPCTF
Based on the potential entry points, the insider can attack in the heater control system by three
means: (1) attack by tampering with sensor data T2 ; (2) manipulation of the control commands
C2; and (3) modification to the setpoints of T2 . Types of attacks may include false-data
injection attack, replay attacks, and other more sophisticated deception attacks.
Given that the attacker aims to attack the heater outlet temperature of T2 , an attack tree can be
constructed to analyze these possible attacks in Figure 3.5.
G: Attack goal

OR

OR
OR

AND
v11: Physical
law

v10: Modified
setpoint

v3: Control law

v6: Modified
C2

v7: Recorded
T2

v2: Tampered
T2

v9:Entry point
A3

v5:Entry point
A2

Insider attack

v1:Entry point
A1

v8: Setpoint

v4: Control
signal C2

v0: Sensor
measurement
T2

Figure 3.5 Attack tree analysis of the heater control system
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Based on the attack tree, it can be observed how an attacker can advantage of system
vulnerabilities from the cyber space to physical process. Attack steps and attack path can also
be derived from the attack tree.

3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, a general analysis of the vulnerabilities subject to insider attacks are presented.
Possible entry points and the corresponding insider attacks are listed based on the system
architecture. An attack tree is used to analyze impacts of attacks and to demonstrate the
relationship between system vulnerabilities and insider attacks.
To demonstrate some basic concepts, a specific cyber-physical system, NPCTF, is used as an
example in this chapter. A heater control loop in NPCTF is selected to demonstrate how an
attack tree can be constructed. Based on the analysis and discussion in this chapter, various
case studies will be carried out for specific aspects in attack generation, detection and defense
in the following chapters.
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Chapter 4

4

Design of a Modular Platform for Security Assessment of
Cyber-Physical Systems

4.1 Introduction
Many research works have been done recently to investigate security aspects of CPSs by
developing techniques to identify vulnerabilities in existing systems that could potentially be
exploited by attackers [135, 136] and assessing impacts in an event of a security compromise
[137]. Subsequently, various detection and mitigation strategies are proposed to boost the
security and to minimize the consequences of these attacks [32, 76]. However, before these
techniques can be deployed in practice, it is necessary to evaluate their effectiveness first in an
environment that resembles the realistic situation as much as possible. Due to destructive
nature of some of the cyber-physical attacks, it may not be safe, nor practical to carry out some
attacks on the real process being protected, even under strict control, just to validate the
security measures. As a result, many results in the previous research works remain in an
idealized and a theoretical level until they are fully battle-tested by experiments in a physical
environment [138]. Hence, it is safe to say that the nature and effectiveness of many existing
security protection, detection and mitigation techniques are still not yet truly dependable.
To ensure the effectiveness of these techniques, it is essential to have a security assessment
platform to analyze vulnerabilities in a cyber-physical system, and to experimentally validate
and evaluate these techniques in a safe and controlled manner. Through this platform, one
should be able to generate various attack scenarios after exploiting system vulnerabilities, and
to implement different defense strategies, and finally to evaluate the strength of the security
under various operating scenarios [139]. To meet the needs of simulating variety of attacks for
different cyber-physical systems, it is highly desirable that the platform be modular and
flexible.
In this chapter, a generalized guideline for testing security of cyber-physical systems is
developed. The platform is composed of four main modules. Various types of attacks can be
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modeled in the Attack Scenario Generation Module. Detection of potential security threats and
corresponding defense strategies are implemented in the Security Enhancement Module. The
level of security for a cyber-physical system can be analyzed and assessed in the Security
Evaluation Module. The Platform Management Module ensures smooth operation of these
three functional modules in real-time.
To validate the effectiveness of the proposed platform, an experimental demonstration has been
carried out using a cyber-physical system in a laboratory environment. The case studies have
shown that security test experiments can be tailored to evaluate various scenarios on such a
platform. The proposed platform can be used to explore system vulnerabilities, to evaluate
security enhancement strategies, and to assess the system security.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes some of the existing work. Section
4.3 presents technical requirements and desirable features of a security assessment platform.
Section 4.4 describes the platform design in detail. Construction of prototype platform is
covered in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 presents results of case studies to demonstrate the features
and effectiveness of the platform. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes this chapter.

4.2 Existing work
Development of experimental cyber-physical security test platforms has been an active topic
of research over the last few years. Several institutions have developed such platforms for
validating and evaluating various cyber security tools and technologies. These platforms also
create realistic environments for testing attack/defense scenarios. Some of the existing
platforms are compiled in Table 4.1, categorized by their intended use, implementation details,
and application domains.
Most existing security platforms are focused on cyber-attacks originated from communication
protocols or network configurations in cyber layers [147]. The main protections against such
attacks are intrusion prevention and detection in the network, which strongly lean towards
cyber security aspects. However, in a cyber-physical system, information in the cyber layer is
closely coupled with the behaviors of physical process [153]. An evil goal of a perpetrator is

42

no longer merely to cause a network disruption, rather to inflict maximum damage to the
physical process. Hence, further to the information in the cyber layer and the physical process,
cyber-physical interactions and their interdependencies need to be considered when securing
a cyber-physical system. For this purpose, a cross-layer platform is needed to support in-depth
study of various aspects of cyber-physical security issues.

Table 4.1 Existing security testing platforms
Classification

Categories

References
[139], [140], [141], [139, 142‐

Use of the

Cyber security

145], [146, 147], [148], [149,
150]

platform
Control theoretic‐based security

[151],[152]

Real cyber, real physical

[140], [141], [142]

Physical vs

Real cyber, simulated physical

[139, 143, 144]

simulation in

Simulated cyber, real physical

[146, 147]

implementation

Simulated cyber, simulated physical

[148],[152]

Hybrid (hardware‐in‐the loop)

[151], [149, 150]

Smart grids
Targeted
domains

[139, 143, 144] [146, 147],
[148]

Power systems

[142], [149, 150] , [152]

SCADA

[146, 147], [148]

Water treatment plants

[151],[141]

From an operational safety point of view, a control system for the CPS should be designed
such that, when a malicious attack is detected, the safety of the system should be maintained.
For this reason, the platform must be implemented in such a way to automate test workflows
and accommodate cyber-security evaluation through various test cases, while maintaining
safety for entire system. In other words, the platform needs to integrate both cyber-physical
security functionalities and control system actions within the same framework. To the best of
our knowledge, there are no such platforms reported in the open literature.
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There are various implemented methods to present a cyber-physical environment with different
research concerns. With heavily inclined focus on cyber security over cyber-physical security,
many existing security platforms are implemented using high-fidelity models or even real
cyber components for the cyber parts, but with much simplified or even software simulated
physical processes, such as in [139, 143, 144]. Unfortunately, an overly simplified physical
process may not be able to provide in-depth information on the behavior of actual physical
process, its control systems, and more importantly cyber-physical interactions during an attack.
It is shown that the platforms built on physical installations in [146, 147] do provide more
insightful responses from the physical processes. One can also capture interactions among
cyber and physical parts for realistic cyber-physical system interactions in the security
experiments. However, the use of physical components does not always guarantee repeatability
as there are so many uncontrollable factors involved. It is also difficult to maintain original
system functionalities, especially when attack tests are underway.
On the other hand, platforms based entirely on simulation in [148] and [152] provide strong
repeatability, but they only represent a limited number of practical scenarios. The results of
tests may not be representative, and test credibility could be in question for general cases,
especially when cyber-physical interactions are strong and interdependent. However, although
these implemented methods provide various solutions on how to reproduce a specific cyberphysical environment, discussions on how to develop and conduct security tests based on the
implemented cyber-physical environment are very limited.
Thus, it is necessary to extract key features of a security platform and to design a generalized
prototype security platform that is applicable to different cyber-physical systems. In addition,
it would be helpful if the common aspects could be extracted into a modular design, as it
provides flexibility to add or change features to support various test scenarios for different
security concerns.
Furthermore, many existing researches on cyber-physical security platforms are domainspecific, such as power systems [142], [149, 150] , [152] and water treatment plants [151],
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[141]. One of the reasons might be that domain knowledge and specific implementation details
may be relevant to understand the mind of a potential attacker. However, there are many attack
scenarios are common across different application domains. It would be useful to develop some
general design guidelines for test platforms to investigate various security issues independent
of domain of applications.
After a literature review, the following shortcomings in the existing platforms have been
identified:



Most of works in the context of security platforms are focused on cyber security, lack of
works to study cyber-physical security, and to combine cyber-physical security and
control systems for securing a cyber-physical system.



There are currently no generalized design methods on how to design a security assessment
platform.



There are no modular design and implementation of security testing platforms in the
published work.

This chapter provides a design method for an experimental security assessment platform to
address the above-mentioned shortcomings and meet the comprehensive requirements of a
cyber-physical security test platform. Key features of the proposed platform are:



Provide general design methodologies for different cyber-physical systems found in
different domain of applications;



Adopt a modular design philosophy so that different modules can be selected and
assembled to meet unique needs in different security evaluation scenarios; and



Support cross-layer tests for cyber-physical security and combine control system design
with the consideration of cyber-physical security.
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4.3

Platform requirements

The functionalities of the platform are as follows.



Identify vulnerabilities in both cyber and physical layers that might be exploited by
attackers;



Generate various attack scenarios to expose and identify vulnerabilities of the cyberphysical system and to understand the cascading effects of an attack;



Develop and validate different cyber-physical security enhancement solutions to increase
system resilience; and



Evaluate the results of security tests and provide insights and procedures for mitigating
the effects of the attacks and minimizing their impacts.

According to the expected functions, the proposed platform is decomposed into three main
functional modules and one Platform Management Module. The three functional modules are:
(1) Attack Scenario Generation Module, (2) Security Enhancement Module, and (3) Security
Evaluation Module. The modules and their respective functionalities are summarized in Table
4.2. Requirements of each module is analyzed according to the expected functionalities.

4.3.1 Requirements of functional modules
4.3.1.1 Requirements for Attack Scenario Generation Module
Vulnerabilities can be identified by analyzing potential avenues that an attacker could take to
mount an attack. For this purpose, attack scenarios need to be generated and their profiles need
to be extracted. This module is known as Attack Scenario Generation Module. The module
should be able to generate both preprogrammed attacks and customized attacks based on the
specific research interests and practical concerns. The preprogrammed attack scenarios can be
generated automatically or manually, other attacks can be generated by the users based on their
specific knowledge and acquired resources.
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Table 4.2 Summary of functional modules
Functional
Modules

Functionalities

Description

Vulnerability analysis

Explore existing vulnerabilities

Attack Scenario
Generation

Generate different attack scenarios to examine
Attack tests

how an attack could inflict physical damage from

Module

the cyber domain
Impact assessment

Security
Enhancement
Module

Security
Evaluation
Module

Tests

of detection

methods
Tests

of

Management
Module

Implement different detection rules

defense Reconfigure and perform various decision‐

strategies

making logics and defense strategies

Security assessment Develop various metrics to evaluate the security
metrics
Security evaluation

Monitoring of tests
Platform

Assess the impact of various attacks

related performance
Assess effectiveness for different defense
strategies
Ensure a safe experimental environment for
security tests

Adding/removing

Modularized design, flexible to add/remove

functional modules

scenarios for specific security issues

Data collection and
analysis

Log data of each test scenario

A process to generate a cyber-physical attack scenario is shown in Figure 4.1. This process is
developed based on an attack kill-chain in [165]. An attack can be launched in two stages. At
the preparation stage, the attacker needs to get access to the communication channel, gathers
required information, develops attack strategies and builds the attack path to deliver the attacks.
Therefore, to generate an attack scenario, the Attack Scenario Generation Module should
contain communication interface to capture network traffic and gain network information,
design attack scripts to generate attack scenarios, and triggering schemes to trigger the attack
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scenarios. During the attack execution stage, to capture and extract the attack profiles, the
Attack Scenario Generation Module should be able to monitor and record the attack activities.

Attack process
Stage 1: Attack Preparation
 Access to process data through
network
 Required system information
 Cyber-physical interaction
 Data capturing and parsing
Cyber
intrusion

Gather
information

 Attack targets and
goals
 Attack path
 Attack method

Stage 2: Attack Execution

 Communication interface
 Trigger conditions

Develop

Deliver

 Attack action
 Data manipulation
 Hiding attack impact

Exploit

Execute

Physical
damage

Protection, Prevention, Detection and Mitigation
Defensive strategies

Figure 4.1 Process to generate an attack

4.3.1.2 Requirements for Security Enhancement Module
To foil an imminent cyber-physical attack, a cross-layered detection scheme and defense-indepth mitigation system is needed. This is carried out by a Security Enhancement Module. The
module should be able to accommodate various strategies for security enhancement and
flexible enough to change detection or defense strategies. Integration of cyber-physical
security and control should be taken into account in the meanwhile. An example of a defense
framework is shown in Figure 4.2 [67]. Once the attack detection scheme reveals an imminent
attack, and attack mitigation scheme can be activated by the detection mechanism to respond
to the detected threat and reduce its adverse effects.

4.3.1.3 Requirements for Security Evaluation Module
A comprehensive evaluation framework, together with a set of user-friendly tools is also
needed for examining and evaluating the security and defense-readiness levels. This is
performed by a Security Evaluation Module.
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Decision-making
scheme

Attack-resilient
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Figure 4.2 Defense framework for a cyber-physical system
Development of these techniques and tools may require data interaction and aggregation from
different sources. Some in-depth security analysis and evaluation of the related systems is also
needed within the platform. Furthermore, measurable security metrics also needs to be defined
to assess the effectiveness of detection and mitigation schemes.

4.3.2 Overall design of the proposed platform
To meet the technical requirements, an overall framework of the proposed platform is proposed
as in Figure 4.3. The locations of modules and data interactions are also illustrated in Figure
4.3.
The Attack Scenario Generation Module is connected with the cyber-physical system via an
activation switch. The Security Enhancement Module is connected to the device
communication channel and controllers to detect anomalies and execute attack mitigation
strategies. The Security Evaluation Module gathers information from the process and other
modules, and defines suitable security metrics for system security evaluation. The Platform
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Management Module consists of an off-line part and an on-line part. Based on specific test
requirements of a given scenarios, the off-line part determines suitable module compositions
to form an effective test environment, while the on-line part oversees the entire operation of
the platform during the test process to ensure safety and operational effectiveness.

Platform Management Module
Security Evaluation Module

Attack database
Attack Scenario
Generator

Supervisory
system

Operator
workstation

Activation Switch

Communication network

Attack Scenario Generation
Module

Controllers

HMI

Servers

Security
Enhancement
Module

Communication network

Sensors

Physical
processes

Actuators

Figure 4.3 Proposed architecture of a cyber-physical security platform

4.4 Design of functional modules
4.4.1 Attack Scenario Generation Module
To identify potential vulnerabilities and to trace consequences of an attack, an Attack Scenario
Generation Module is designed to mimic realistic cyber-physical attacks. The details of this
module are shown in Figure 4.4. It contains four sub-blocks stored in the form of an Attack
Library, i.e. attack scripts, targeted channel selection, attack duration setting, and attack trigger
logics. Descriptions of these sub-blocks are further listed in Table 4.3.
In addition, there is an activation switch within this module, which captures and transmits data
between this module and the cyber-physical part of the system. A user can gain access to the
targeted network channel via this activation switch either remotely through a network or by
tapping into the network physically through pre-defined open ports.
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Attack Scenario Generator

Data packet

Attack scripts

Attack library

Activation switch

Tampered
data packet

Target channel selection
Attack duration setting
Attack trigger logics

Figure 4.4 Organization of an Attack Scenario Generation Module
Table 4.3 Attack library in an Attack Scenario Generation Module
Sub‐blocks

Description

Attack scripts

Design details of the attack scenarios

Target channel selection

Selection of access points for targeted communication channels

Attack duration setting

Record of the process for a staged attack scenario
Attack triggered when a pre‐determined input is detected

Attack trigger

Attack triggered when a particular trigger sequence is detected

mechanism [133]

Attack triggered when the timer has ended its count sequence
Attack triggered when a particular internal state is achieved

This module is connected to the communication network between the field devices and the
controller, and between the controller and the supervisory workstation. It is capable of
interrupting or manipulating sensor readings and control flow through this switch. The
implemented work includes gathering and parsing the communication data packets, designing
attack scripts, building up attack paths, and setting up target communication channels, attack
duration, and trigger conditions.
This module is designed as an open-source attack library. Pre-programmed attack scripts and
trigger logics are constructed within the attack library. This module is generic to generate
various attack scenarios in different communication channels. All the sub-blocks within the
module can be edited, added or removed based on the requirements in the tests. Attack scripts
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in the module can be written and stored in the library, it can also be generated by the user of
this platform.
This module is implemented on a separate computer. It provides a wide attack surface
including data attacks on sensors, actuators and controllers. It is an open source platform not
only for the pre-programed attack scenarios, but also for other customized tests.
Outcomes of the Attack Scenario Generation Module are as follows:



Vulnerability analysis of an existing architecture, cyber access, communication protocols,
data flows between the control system and the physical process;



Vulnerability indicators for security enhancement; and



Index for evaluating attack impacts.

4.4.2 Security Enhancement Module
To mitigate adverse effects of an attack, detection and mitigation schemes are implemented in
this module. The composition of the module is shown in Figure 4.5. This module contains
several sub-functional blocks to support testing and validation of various detection and
mitigation strategies. The detailed functional units are described in Table 4.4.
There are three main functional parts in the Security Enhancement Module. The first one is for
data collection and processing. The second one is for cross-layer attack detection. It supports
process anomaly detection in physical layer, anomaly detection in cyber-physical layer, and
network intrusion detection in the cyber layer. These detection results are forwarded to
decision-making unit in the supervisory station. The third part is for attack mitigation. It
consists of a decision-making unit and control algorithms. Defense-in-depth strategies that
combine control and cyber-physical security can be implemented in these sub-blocks.

52

Security Enhancement Module
Security
metrics

Network
intrusion
detection

Data
processing

Cyber-physical
anomaly
detection

Data
collection

Process
monitoring
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Attack
mitigation
algorithms

Cyber-physical system

Figure 4.5 Function blocks of a Security Enhancement Module
Table 4.4 Cross-layer design of a Security Enhancement Module

Data
preparation

Detection

Sub‐blocks

Description

Data collection

Collecting data from different layers and channels

Data processing

Process and forward data to detection blocks

Security boundary

Defining security boundaries and detection rules

Network intrusion

Detecting intrusions of security boundary in cyber

detection

layers

Anomaly detection in
data transmission
Process monitoring
Decision‐making unit

Defense

Attack mitigation
algorithms

Detecting anomalies in cyber‐physical layer
Detecting anomalies in physical layer
Situation awareness, reconfiguration of operating
conditions, and execution of control actions
Executing attack‐resilient control algorithms

Each functional unit in the Security Enhancement Module can vary in locations and with
different implementation details. Detection schemes are deployed in multiple locations for
cross-layer detection. Defense schemes are deployed in the supervisory system, it includes a
decision-making unit and a control scheme. The decision-making unit is implemented within
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the controllers using specific programming languages, while control algorithms are often
implemented in a Distributed Control System (DCS) or a Programmable Logic Controller
(PLC) and exchange data with the CPS through OPC or other communication channels.
To provide flexibilities for security tests, all the sub-blocks are designed as an independent
modular, which can be operated as a combined unit or individually.
Outcomes of the Security Enhancement Module are potential anomalies and mitigation results
provided by detection methods and mitigation strategies.

4.4.3 Security Evaluation Module
After attack scenarios are generated, and security enhancement strategies are conducted on the
platform, one needs to (1) analyze system vulnerabilities associated with these attack scenarios,
(2) assess their impacts, (3) analyze experimental results, and finally (4) evaluate the system
security under specific mitigation strategies.
These functions are realized in the Security Evaluation Module as outlined in Figure 4.6. There
are three sub-blocks in this module, details are described in Table 4.5. Data sources of this
module are from the Attack Scenario Generation Module, the Security Enhancement Module
and the supervisory system. All data are collected to evaluate the system security, and security
metrics are calculated for security tests.
In Security Evaluation Module, the data from different layers are extracted and sorted out into
two data streams. One is the actual measurements and signal values that are transmitted through
the communication channels; and the other is the attacked values that are observed by the
supervisory system or those forwarded to the physical process. In this module, security metrics
are used as evaluation rules, and system evaluation methods are implemented according to
different objectives.
Outcomes of the Security Evaluation Module include identified vulnerabilities, assessment of
attack impacts, effectiveness of defense strategies, system security awareness and insights of
security enhancement.
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Database from Security
Enhancement Module

Security evaluation
methods

Database from supervisory
system

Outcomes

Figure 4.6 Function blocks of a Security Evaluation Module
Table 4.5 Design consideration in a Security Evaluation Module
Sub‐blocks

Description

Database from Attack
Scenario Generation
Data
sources

Attack information and compromised data

Module
Database from Security
Enhancement Module

Defense information and mitigated data

Database from supervisory

Historian of process status from the

system

communication network

Calculation of metrics

Metrics to measure experimental results
and performance validation

System evaluation methods

Evaluation methods used

Evaluation outcome

System security awareness

4.4.4 Platform Management Module
The Platform Management Module is used to manage other modules as well as the real-time
monitoring of security and vulnerabilities within the platform during tests. Its interfaces with
other modules are shown in Figure 4.7. Since the platform is designed in a modular fashion,
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modules can be easily reconfigured, deployed and initialized according to the needs of specific
security tests.
This module can be implemented in a separate computer to manage all the functional modules
and monitor events and scenarios if necessary.

Platform management

System monitoring

Gateway

Attack Scenario
Generation Module

Security
Enhancement
Module

Security Evaluation
Module

Figure 4.7 Function blocks of a Platform Management Module

4.5 Construction of a prototype platform
A well designed cyber-physical test platform should cover two aspects: (1) an experimental
environment of the cyber-physical system, and (2) required functionalities for security tests.
To demonstrate the inner workings of the proposed platform, a prototype platform is
constructed by integrating all the modules into an experimental environment in Figure 4.3. The
environment is designed to represent key features of a cyber-physical system. The
implementation details for each functional module are presented next.

4.5.1 Composition of a cyber-physical environment
Construction of the experimental environment can be divided into three main layers: (1)
industrial control facilities and software in the cyber layer, (2) communication networks in the
cyber-physical layer, and (3) a physical system including sensors and actuators in the physical
layer.
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Multiple sources for data collection and multiple access points for security tests are needed in
this environment. As such, the functional modules can be connected to the cyber-physical
environment to perform security tests.

4.5.2 Construction of a specific platform
Once the prototype platform is constructed, it is then connected to a cyber-physical
environment known as the nuclear power control test facility (NPCTF). The constructed
security platform on NPCTF is shown in Figure 4.8.
Details for each functional module are as follows. Tools used for each model is listed in the
tables below, implementation details are described in the following sections. Considering the
security of the designed platform and security of NPCTF, the developed code is not publicized,
all the codes are stored in and managed by UWO CIE Lab. The codes package written for this
dissertation are listed in Appendix A, demo videos for the platform and tests are listed in
Appendix B.

4.5.2.1 Implementation of the Attack Scenario Generation Module
The Attack Scenario Generation Module is constructed on a separate attack computer under
Kali Linux environment, procedures to generate an attack scenario is illustrated in Figure 4.9.
Each sub-block in Figure 4.4 is implemented with details given in Table 4.6. In order to
generate an attack scenario based on Figure 4.1, a user needs to get access to the
communication network in NPCTF first. An activation switch is implemented as the
communication interface between the Attack Scenario Generation Module and the
communication network in NPCTF. The user can capture and gather the transmitted data
packets through this activation switch. In order to read and inject attack scenarios,
communication protocols are parsed, and attack scripts are compiled in Python language.
Currently, three types of cyber-physical attack scripts are developed in this module, i.e.
deception attack, false-data injection attack and replay attack. Since this module is an opensource platform, users can customize it and generate other cyber-physical attack scenarios as
situations require.
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Generation Module
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ABB AC700F

Physical Process
Cyber-physical environment (NPCTF)

Figure 4.8 Composition of the prototype security platform
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There are three communication channels that can be selected in the Attack Scenario Generation
Module: (1) Channel 1 connects the network between the sensors to the controllers, (2)
Channel 2 connects the network between the controller and the actuators, and (3) Channel 3
connects the network between the controllers and the supervisory station. These channels
represent the attack entry points A1, A2 and A3 in Figure 3.1, respectively.
Attacks can be generated and launched from a separate attack computer. HMIs and PLCs are
on two different subnets and connected through an Ethernet using TCP/IP. Bi-direction
communication channels have been constructed by reversing the control protocols, transmitted
data packet can be extracted through the activation switch. In this implementation, three types
of cyber-physical attack scenarios are developed: deception attack, false-data injection attack
and replay attack. Two trigger logics are also designed in the attack library.
The attack duration setting block and the attack trigger block are implemented using Visual
basic language, which can generate the attack duration setting and trigger the attack scenarios.
Preparation phase

Design phase

Execution phase

Attack goal
(Intended impact)

Attack action

Attack channel
setting

Attack points

Database
Attack timing

Attack path
(start to end)

Trigger logics

Type of attack

Attack
algorithms

Activation
switch

CPS

Figure 4.9 Procedures to generate an attack scenario
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Table 4.6 Implementation of an Attack Scenario Generation Module
Sub‐blocks

Functions
Capture transmission
data packet

Attack scripts

Tools
Wireshark

Parse communication
protocols and construct

Python language

attack scenarios
Attack data
Target channel
selection

transmission

Industrial activation switch

Build graphical user
interface (GUI) for

Visual Basic

channel selection
Attack duration

Build GUI for attack

setting

duration setting

Attack trigger

Build GUI for selection

schemes

of trigger logics

Visual Basic

Visual Basic

4.5.2.2 Implementation of the Security Enhancement Module
To validate the detection and defense schemes, the detection and defense function block is
implemented on the NPCTF through an OPC server, as shown in Figure 4.10. Data
transmission and algorithms for detection and defense function unit are detailed in Table 4.7.
Different detection methods in different layers are implemented in the detection sub-blocks.
Network intrusion detection unit and anomaly detection for cyber-physical interactions are
deployed in the supervisory station using Snort. The anomaly detection unit for process data is
implemented in a separate workstation. It collects the process data online through an OPC
server in the supervisory station and performs the detection algorithms real-time in MATLAB.
When there is an alarm, the detection unit will send the detected anomaly to the supervisory
station.
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Data
communication
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Security
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Module
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Figure 4.10 Implementation of a Security Enhancement Module on NPCTF
Table 4.7 Construction of a Security Enhancement Module
Sub-blocks

Data
preparation

Detection

Defense

Functions

Tools

Physical process
data collection

Collect process data

Freelance OPC
2000

Network data
collection

Capture transmitted data packets

Wireshark

Data processing

Analyze and process datasets

BASE

Security boundary

Define security metrics and safety
thresholds as detection rules

Snort

Network intrusion
detection

Scan port
Detect network intrusions

Nmap
Snort

Anomaly
detection

Monitor cyber-physical interactions
Construct detection methods

Snort
MATLAB

Process data
anomaly detection

Monitor process data

DigiVis

Decision-making
unit

Configuration in Supervisory station

Control Builder F

Attack mitigation
algorithms

Compute the control parameters

MATLAB
Control Builder F
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Defense schemes are implemented in the supervisory station. Decision-making logics and
controller structures are reconfigured through ABB Control Builder F and are loaded to PLC.
Control algorithms are implemented in MATLAB to calculate the parameters of the
reconfigured controller. The calculated parameters are sent back to PLC through OPC server.

4.5.2.3 Implementation of the Security Evaluation Module
During the operation, the status of the platform needs to be logged for further analysis and
evaluation. The logged dataset contains the physical properties related to the process, as well
as the network traffic including those in the midst of attacks. Security metrics are based on a
specific area and concerns, and evaluation methods are implemented in the supervisory station
and connected to NPCTF through an OPC server.
Implementation procedures for the Security Evaluation Module is shown in Figure 4.11. It
resides on the supervisory station.
In the Security Evaluation Module, data from different layers are extracted and sorted into two
streams. One is for control commands and parameters that compromise the network protocols;
and the other is for the current state of the observed process variables [154].
In this chapter, NPCTF is served as a target physical process to demonstrate how the proposed
design methods can be used to construct a specific security assessment platform. The proposed
modular design is not restricted to only NPCTF, it can also be applied to other cyber-physical
systems. It provides guidelines and methods to build up a cyber-physical security assessment
platform.

62

1. Security evaluation setup
Cyber-physical
system

Define security
evaluation goals

Security metrics

Vulnerability
identification

System vulnerabilities

Anomaly detection
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2. Vulnerability assessment
Attack scenarios

3. Security enhancement (Detection)
Detection tests

4. Security enhancement (Defense)
Defense tests

Mitigation strategies

Security enhancement
evaluation

Figure 4.11 Implementation procedures for a Security Evaluation Module

4.6 Case Studies
To study the features and effectiveness of the proposed platform, case studies including various
cyber-physical attack scenarios, detection methods and mitigation strategies are performed on
NPCTF using the platform, as shown in Figure 4.8. The selected system to mount attacks is
the heater control loop of NPCTF, as shown in Figure 4.12.
In the heater control loop, the outlet temperature T2 is regulated by the heater current C2
through a proportional (P) controller. When the temperature T2 is below the setpoint value, the
controller (AC700F) will send out a command to increase the heater current. An anomaly
detection scheme is designed according to the minimum (LL=15℃) and maximum (HH=37℃)
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thresholds defined by the system safety specifications. If the measured temperature T2 exceeds
37℃, the alarm will be triggered to cut off the current supply and subsequently trip the system
shut down.
Supervisory station

Attack Scenario
Generation Module

Control communication network

Activation switch

Controller (AC700F)
T2'

C2
Device communication network

T2
Sensor

C2'
Heater

Actuators

Figure 4.12 Cyber-physical attacks on the heater control loop
The attack goal is to drive T2 beyond its safety limit without being detected.

4.6.1 Experiment design
The experiment consists of three cases.
Case #1 is to validate the functionality of the Attack Scenario Generation Module. System
vulnerabilities are explored through six attack scenarios. In order to reflect different attack
surfaces and scenarios supported by the Attack Scenario Generation Module, three different
attack scenarios are launched on sensor measurement T2 , and three different attack scenarios
are launched on the control signals to actuator C2. The implemented attack scenarios are
described in Table 4.8.
Case #2 is to validate the functionality of the Security Enhancement Module and test various
cross-layered detection methods. There are four detection methods, D1-D4, that are deployed
to detect the anomalies induced by various attack scenarios on NPCTF, as listed in Table 4.9.
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Case #3 is to evaluate the performance of attack mitigation strategies. Different mitigation
methods M1-M3, are development and tested. Design methods are listed in Table 4.9.

Table 4.8 Attack scenarios launched on the platform
Attack entry Attack
point
Sensor
measurement

T2

Control
commands to
actuator C2

scenario
SA1

Attack type

Attack description

False‐data

Modify T2 (t )  T2 (t )  0.05t

injection attack

SA2

Replay attack

SA3

DoS Attack

AA1

False‐data
injection attack

AA2

Replay attack

AA3

DoS Attack

Record and replay historical data when
injecting attacks
Blocking sensor measurements for 20s
Inject a deviation of 10% to C2
Record and replay historical data when
injecting attacks
Blocking control commands to actuator for 10s

Table 4.9 Security enhancement methods used in Case #2
Security enhancements

Detection methods

Mitigation methods

Methods

Techniques

D1

Safety threshold (HH)

D2

Rule‐based network intrusion detection

D3

CUSUM method: τ=0.5, b=1

D4

Physical watermarking method [37]

M1

P controller

M2

Decision‐making unit

M3

A PI controller with a state estimator

Mitigation methods consist of a decision-making unit M2 and a resilient control system M3.
When M2 receives anomaly alarms generated from detection methods, it will decide how to
respond to the attacks for the given situation.
Evaluation work are constructed based on these three case studies. Security evaluation metrics
together with evaluation methods EV1-EV3 are defined in Table 4.10.
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Outline of the experimental designs are presented in Table 4.11.

Table 4.10 Definition of security metrics
Evaluation

Concerns

Security metrics

Effectiveness of the
Attack Scenario

Test effectiveness

Generation Module
Case #1: EV1

Are correct attack scenarios
generated?

Attack successful

Achieve attack goal before

Exploring

criteria

being detected

vulnerabilities

Attack duration

Start time and end time

Impact of attacks

Attack impacts
Detection
effectiveness

Evaluating
Case #2: EV2

Description

performance of
detection methods

System dynamics and
consequences
If attack is detected timely?
Time to detect an attack

Detection speed

measured from the moment
the attack starts

Case #3: EV3

Evaluating

Mitigation

performance of

effectiveness

mitigation methods

Response to attacks

If attacks are mitigated?
System dynamics

Table 4.11 Case studies on the platform
Security tests
Implemented attacks

Case #1

Case #2

SA1, SA2, SA3

SA1, SA2, SA3

AA1, AA2, AA3

AA1, AA2, AA3

Case #3
SA1, SA2

D2
Detection methods

D1

D3

D2+D3+D4

D4
Mitigation methods

M1: P Controller

M1: P Controller

M2+M3

Evaluation Methods

EV1

EV2

EV3
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4.6.2 Experimental results
4.6.2.1 Case #1: Exploring system vulnerabilities
In this case study, six attack scenarios have been implemented to investigate system
vulnerabilities. The experimental results of three attacks on sensor measurements (SA1, SA2,
SA3) are shown in Figure 4.13.
In SA1, the method of the attack is to manipulate the sensor data from T2 by adding a slowly
varying negative offset Δ T2 = -0.05t and then sending it to PLC. The attack is set to be triggered
at a predefined time tstart=25s. As shown in Figure 4.13(a), when the actual signal T2 exceeds
its safety limit of 37℃ at 164s, the tampered T2 (Attacked signal) sent to the PLC is only
appeared to be 24℃, the anomaly detection scheme is fooled.
In SA2, a replay attack is implemented during the transmission of the sensor measurement, the
actual T2 is replaced by a recorded historical data. When SA2 begins at time t=25s, the heater
is running at its setpoint T2 =30℃. The recorded data is sent to the controller, the deviation
between the fake T2 and the setpoint of T2 leads to an increase of actual T2 . As shown in Figure
4.13(b), the replay attack continues being undetected until the actual T2 is out of its safety limit
of 37℃.
In SA3, the data packet is blocked for 20s when transmitted from the sensor to the controller.
The last received data of T2 is used during the communication interruption. It can be observed
in Figure 4.13(c)that the DoS attack does not have a major impact if the system is at a steady
state when the attack is launched.
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(c) DoS attack on sensor (SA3)

Figure 4.13 Attack scenarios on the temperature sensor data
Attacks on the actuator data (AA1, AA2, AA3) are implemented and the results are
demonstrated in Figure 4.14. It can be observed that attacks have compromised the control
signals and sent tampered control commands to the actuators (Left part in Figure 4.14). The
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tampered control commands then drive the physical process out of the safety limit (Right part
in Figure 4.14).
This case study has validated that the Attack Scenario Generation Module can generate various
cyber-physical attacks on different attack surfaces. Attack impact and system vulnerabilities
can be extracted and analyzed from the generated attack scenarios.

Figure 4.14 Attack scenarios on the heater actuator
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4.6.2.2 Case #2: Developing and testing multi-layer detection methods
In this case, different detection methods have been configured to reveal the anomalies from
cyber-physical attacks. Based on the defined security metrics for Case #2, the results of the
implemented detection methods are summarized in Table 4.12.
The detection results have shown that various detection methods can be tested and evaluated
on this platform. Different detection methods can be compared or integrated with respect to
specific vulnerabilities. For example, the safety threshold method (D1) can only detect attacks
that break system safety limit. Rule-based methods are effective for attacks that do not conform
to the rules, but it does not work for stealthy attacks. CUSUM method (D3) provides fast
detection speed, and physical watermarking method (D4) is more effective in detecting replay
attacks. Furthermore, this platform can also be used to test the comprehensive performance of
an integrated detection scheme that includes various different detection methods.

Table 4.12 Results of detection methods on the platform
Attack
scenario

Attack Detection effectiveness
start
time

D1

D2

Detection speed
D3

D4

D1

D2

D3

D4

SA1

t=25s

Undetected Undetected Detected

Detected ‐‐

‐‐

6s

13s

SA2

t=30s

Undetected Undetected Detected

Detected ‐‐

‐‐

4s

3s

SA3

t=30s

Undetected Detected

Undetected Detected ‐‐

2s

‐‐

8s

AA1

t=35s

Detected

Detected

Detected 97s 12s 3s

8s

AA2

t=30s

Undetected Undetected Detected

Detected ‐‐

‐‐

6s

6s

AA3

t=60s

Undetected Detected

Detected ‐‐

3s

10s 10s

Detected

Detected

4.6.2.3 Case #3: Evaluating the performance of mitigation strategies
In order to mitigate the effects of attacks, a multi-layer attack-resilient control system is
implemented within the Security Enhancement Module. In this case, a false-data injection
attack (SA1) and a replay attack (SA2) are implemented on the system, respectively. Detection
methods D2, D3 and D4 work together to detect anomalies, decision-making logic M2 is used
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to determine which controller should be switched. It is designed that the original P controller
is operating when there is no attack detected. When an anomaly alarm is triggered, the
controller M3 will be switched to reduce the impacts of attacks. The experimental results are
shown in Figure 4.15.
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(a) Attack mitigation under SA1
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Figure 4.15 Attack mitigation against attacks
The results have shown that the control system design incorporates the cyber-physical security.
When the anomaly is detected, the decision-making logic will respond to these anomalies and
select the corresponding control algorithm. When the false-data attack deviates the
measurement of T2 , CUSUM method (D3) detects the deviation and trigger an attack alarm.
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The corresponding controller will respond and compensate the deviation to maintain the
system variables within the normal operating range. Hence, the effect of the deviation caused
by the attack is neutralized, and the measurement of T2 will return to its desired value. When
the replay attack hides the actual sensor measurement T2 by a recorded data, physical
watermarking detection (D4) reveals the anomaly. The decision-making unit will use the
setpoint of T2 to substitute T2 , and the controller will bring the heater temperature back to its
setpoint.
Implementation of the presented security platform demonstrates that the proposed design
method for a security platform can be easily applied to a specific cyber-physical environment.
The case studies have shown that the proposed platform is effective to perform various security
tests. The modularized design makes the security tests flexible. The platform provides a crosslayer Security Enhancement Module, which could take security in cyber and cyber-physical
layer into consideration during controller design.

4.7 Conclusions
This chapter provides a design guideline for an experimental security platform, and proposes
a modular approach to design and implement such a platform for security study of cyberphysical systems. The developed platform consists of three functional modules: (1) Attack
Scenario Generation Module, (2) Security Enhancement Module, and (3) Security Evaluation
Module. The first module can be used to mimic attack scenarios to expose potential system
vulnerabilities. The second module supports various strategies to detect, prevent, and mitigate
potential attacks. Finally, the third module creates a multi-layer systematic environment to
analyze and evaluate the identified security issues. The platform also consists of a Platform
Management Module to manage the three functional modules and monitor the test in process.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed systems and techniques, a specific prototype
platform has been designed and implemented by using a physical component based dynamic
system simulator, known as nuclear process control test facility (NPCTF). Case studies have
been carried out on this platform to demonstrate the features and feasibilities of the proposed
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platform. Different security scenarios have been implemented and their effects have been
evaluated to study the effectiveness of the three functional modules. Experimental results have
validated this modular design approach and demonstrated that the platform can be an effective
tool to analyze vulnerabilities, and to evaluate the effectiveness of different security enhanced
strategies for cyber-physical systems. Test results can also provide insights to security
strengthening strategies.
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Chapter 5

5

Analysis and Formulation of Insider Attacks through Data
Tampering

5.1 Introduction
To ensure that insider attacks do not cause major disruptions to cyber-physical systems, it is
critical to understand how the system is impacted by an attacker and how to detect these attacks.
This chapter focuses on analysis and modeling of insider attacks through data tampering, to be
more precise, attacks that may try to disable or tamper with sensor measurements or control
signals during transmission process.
In this chapter, a method to analyze and characterize the features of insider attacks is proposed.
Firstly, the model of a cyber-physical system subject to insider attacks is analyzed in the
framework of a cyber-physical system. Then, an attack pattern is captured in terms of attack
goals, resources, constraints, modes, as well as potential attack paths. Next, conditions to
achieve stealthy attacks are analyzed. Attack process is analyzed based on these attributes in
the attack pattern. potential impacts of such attacks on the system behavior are analyzed using
an attack tree. Finally, case studies are carried out to demonstrate effectiveness of the proposed
work.

5.2 System analysis
5.2.1 Cyber-physical systems
A cyber-physical control system can be conceptually divided into four main parts as shown in
Figure 5.1: a physical process, a communication network, a controller, sensors and actuators.
An anomaly detection scheme can also be introduced to such a system.
In the control loop, the sensor measurements and control commands are transmitted through a
cyber-enabled communication network. The sensor and actuator signals on the physical side
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can be represented by y(k )  R p and u (k )  R m , respectively. The sensor data and the control
commands at the cyber side are denoted as y (k )  R p and u (k )  R m , respectively.
Anomaly detection scheme uses the observed sensor data y ( k ) and the control commands u ( k )
in the cyber side to detect any anomalies based on the normal operations [156].
The nominal system behavior under normal operations can be defined as u ( k )  u ( k ) and
y ( k )  y ( k ) .
Anomaly detection scheme

Controller
Data tampering attacks
𝒚 𝒌

𝒖 𝒌
Communication Network

𝒚 𝒌

𝒖 𝒌
Actuators

Sensors
Physical process

Figure 5.1 A cyber-physical system with an anomaly detection scheme

5.2.1.1 Physical process model
Assume that the model of the physical process can be represented as:
x( k  1)  Ax( k )  Bu ( k )

(5.1)

y ( k )  Cx( k )

where x(k )  Rn are the system state variables, u (k )  R m is the control command applied to
the process, y(k )  R p is the output of the system, A, B, and C are the system matrices of
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appropriate dimensions, and k  0,1, , N  denotes the discrete-time index, taking values
from the time horizon [0, N].
From Equation (5.1), the output of the system can also be derived as:

y(k  1)  Cx(k  1)

(5.2)

 CAx(k )  CBu (k )
From a security point of view, Equation (5.2) links potential anomalies in the control
commands u ( k ) to the observation of y ( k  1) . Therefore, it is possible to detect anomalies
from the sensor measurements through proper data processing.

5.2.1.2 Anomaly detection scheme
An anomaly detection scheme is used to monitor the system behavior and detect possible
anomalies. Sensor data y ( k ) and control signals u (k ) are collected in an anomaly detection
scheme.
Given sensor data y ( k ) and control signals u (k ) are known at time k, the system state at time
(k+1) can be estimated as
xˆ ( k  1)  L1 ( xˆ ( k ), u ( k ), y ( k  1))

(5.3)

where L1 (.) is a state estimator of the system.
The sensor output of the system at time (k+1) can be predicted based on model of the physical
process.
yˆ ( k  1)  CAxˆ ( k )  CBu ( k )

(5.4)

If the system has been attacked, the attack detection scheme will compare the compromised
data y ( k ) with the estimated output yˆ ( k ) . The difference is known as a residual and then can
be used to detect existing anomalies.

76

The residual is defined as:
r ( k ) : y ( k )  yˆ ( k )

(5.5)

The detection scheme is defined as:
Z  f ( r ( k ))

(5.6)

where f (.) is a detection algorithm.
Attack detection decision rule can be defined by testing the following hypothesis:

Z  
 H (No Attack)
Detection   0

 H1 (Under Attack) Z   

(5.7)

where   0 is a pre-selected detection threshold. If the deviation exceeds the detection
threshold, H1 is accepted and the detection scheme will arise an anomaly alarm, otherwise
under the hypothesis H 0 , it means no anomaly has been detected.

5.2.2 Cyber-physical systems under insider attacks
Let an insider attack a (k ) represent the attack at time k, the system input and output under this
attack can now be characterized as y ( k ) or u (k ) . The system model now becomes:
x( k  1)  Ax( k )  Bu ( k )
y ( k )  Cx( k )

(5.8)

If the attacks are only on control commands sent to the actuators, then u ( k )  u ( k ) ,
y ( k )  y ( k ) . The attack offset au ( k ) becomes:
au ( k )  u ( k )  u ( k )

(5.9)

77

If the attacks are only on sensor measurements sent to the controllers, u ( k )  u ( k ) ,
y ( k )  y ( k ) . The attack offset a y ( k ) becomes

a y ( k )  y ( k )  y (k )

(5.10)

If the attacks are both on control commands sent to actuators and sensor measurements,
u ( k )  u ( k ) , y ( k )  y ( k ) . The attack offset becomes a vector a ( k ) as follows:

 au (k )   u (k )  u (k ) 
a (k )  


 a y (k )   y (k )  y (k ) 

(5.11)

5.3 Formulation of insider attacks
In this section, a general analytical formulation of insider attacks is presented and described
firstly, and then three specific attack scenarios are formulated case by case.

5.3.1 Formulation of an attack pattern
An attack pattern describes attack features associated with performing a particular type of
attack [157]. Attack patterns represent a set of undesirable and unexpected operational
behaviors. In this section, an attack pattern is defined as a representation used to model
different insider attack scenarios. Based on the identified vulnerabilities in Chapter 3, each
attack pattern contains six attributes, based on system vulnerabilities, which is defined as a
tuple in Definition 5.1.

Definition 5.1 (Insider attack pattern): An insider attack pattern AP is defined as a tuple
with six attributes.

AP  Gs , Rs , Cs , M , P, I 
where Gs is the attack goal.

(5.12)
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Rs represents the accessible disruption resources related to the attack, which may affect the
integrity of the system components.

Cs represents the conditions used to keep the insider attack stealthy.
M is the attack scenario, which the attacker may take to achieve the goals.
P represents the entry points, attack steps and attack paths for a successful attack.

I represents attack impacts on the system.
The following sub-sections contain detailed descriptions for the above six attributes in an
insider attack pattern.

5.3.1.1 Attack goals
The attack goals might be the penetration process, or a set of exploitation of system
vulnerabilities, or impacts on the behaviors of the systems. In this dissertation, the attack goal
is to drive safety-critical variables out of their safety boundary and cause dangerous impacts
in physical process while keeping stealthy.

5.3.1.2 Attack resources
Attack resources include knowledge of system model, interactions among various sub-systems,
and those resources that the attacker may possess relating to targeted components in the system.
Attackers can compromise CPS information with specific objectives. It is assumed herein that
the adversary: (1) has knowledge of the system dynamics, (2) the information of the control
and/ or anomaly detection strategies; and (3) aims to conduct a malicious action that will
compromise system if not being detected in time.
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5.3.1.3 Stealthy conditions
Stealth conditions can be viewed as constraints from an attacker point of view. For the linear
system described in Equation (5.1), the attack is stealthy if there is no anomaly alarm detected
by the anomaly detection scheme during an attack.
In this dissertation, it is assumed that the attack is launched without violating the constraints
of stealthy conditions. Stealthy conditions will further be analyzed in detail in Section 5.4.1.

5.3.1.4 Attack methods
Attack methods refer to the ways that an adversary may take to carry out an attack. Formulation
Three insider attack methods have been considered in this chapter: deception attack, false-data
injection attack, and replay attack. These attack methods have been formulated in Section 5.3.2.

5.3.1.5 Attack paths and attack steps
Attack paths and steps describe how an attack is to be carried out to achieve its intended goals.
In this chapter, a comprehensive attack tree that integrates attack scenarios and vulnerabilities
of the system is developed in Section 5.4.2 to plan out the possible attack paths and identify
the corresponding attack steps from the cyber domain to the physical processes.

5.3.1.6 Attack impacts
Attack impacts are analyzed in an attack tree in Section 5.4.2 as well.

5.3.2 Formulation of insider attacks
In order to characterize the features of insider attacks from a system point of view, this section
discusses two types of insider attack strategies and their related mathematical models. The first
is a deception attack and a false-data injection attack. The objective is to mislead the anomaly
detection mechanism and inject false data stealthily. The second is a replay attack, which hides
its malicious attack action by replaying a healthy historical data sequence in the system.
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5.3.2.1 Deception attack
During a deception attack, sensor data y ( k ) and control signals u (k ) are tampered to u (k ) and
y ( k ) , respectively.

Considering the attacker’s access to the communication channels in cyber layers, a deception
attacks can be modeled as:
u ( k )  u ( k )   u au ( k )
y ( k )  y ( k )   y a y ( k )

(5.13)

a ( k )    u au ( k )  y a y ( k ) 

where au (k ) and a y (k ) represent the attack signals to the corresponding sensor and control
channels, u  0,1 and  y  0,1 are the binary index matrix that indicate the connectivity
status between the attack signals and the corresponding communication channels.

5.3.2.2 False-data injection attack
A false-data injection attack can manipulate the state estimator and insert certain signals into
an unknown subset of sensors and actuators without being detected. A false-data injection
attack on control signals can be modeled as:
u ( k )  u ( k )   u au ( k )

(5.14)

a ( k )   u au ( k )

where u au (k ) is the attack signal injected by the insider attacker to the control channel; and

u  0,1 represents the binary incidence matrix mapping the data corruption to the respective
data channels.
A false-data injection attack on a subset of sensor nodes can be modeled as:
y ( k )  y ( k )   y a y ( k )

(5.15)

a (k )   y a y (k )
y
where  ay (k ) is the tampered signal sent by the inside attacker to the sensor measurement
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y
channel; and   0,1 is a binary index matrix that indicate the connectivity status between

the attack signals and the corresponding communication channels.

5.3.2.3 Replay attack
In replay attacks, the adversary first records a sequence of historical data, then replays the
recorded data to hide his or her malicious actions. A diagram of this replay attack is described
in Figure 5.2. Replay attack mode can be described in two steps:
Step II:
Replay data

Controller input

Step I:
Record data

Actual data

Replayed data

k0

kr

ks

kf

Time

Figure 5.2 Diagram of a replay attack
Let I y (k ) be the set of sensor data to the controller at time k, I (k0 , kr ) represents a set of sensor
data from k0 to kr .
Step I: The attacker records a sequence of sensor measurements I (k0 , kr ) from k0 to kr , there
is no action at this stage.

a(k )  0

 u u (k ) 
Step I: 

I
(
k
)
 y


  y (k ) 


(5.16)

where k0  k  kr and I (0, k0 ) is an empty set before time k0 .
Step II: Starting at time ks  kr  1 , the attacker modifies the sensor signals to the controllers

with the recorded historical data, and inject attacks to control commands.
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u au (k )

a (k )   y

Step II: 
 ( y ( kk T ))  y ( k ) 

 I (k )  I (k  T )

(5.17)

where T  ks  k0 , k s  k  k s  kr  k0 .
Meanwhile, starting at time ks , the attacker might inject a control input u bu (k ) to achieve
their malicious objective, all measurement data during the attack interval may not be available
to the anomaly detection scheme, which helps the attacker to keep stealthy by designing the
attack u au (k ) to achieve the malicious goal.
Given the attack pattern and the corresponding attack methods from different insider attacks,
it is necessary to analyze the stealthy conditions and impacts on the CPS, and to capture their
features from a control and system point of view.

5.4 Analysis of insider attacks
There are two aspects that need to be considered from a control system point of view when
analyzing the impact of an insider attack. One is its stealthy conditions, which can show limit
of the attack, and provide clues for improving the resilience of the control system. Another is
its impact on the system, which includes system performance degradation under insider attacks
as well as the corresponding vulnerabilities related to the attack.

5.4.1 Analysis of stealthy conditions

5.4.1.1 Stealthy condition with attack process
To analyze the stealthy conditions of the attack, attack processes need to be analyzed firstly.
An attack can be divided into several stages from having access to the entry points to achieving
the attack goals. The process can be summarized in Figure 5.3.
Along with the attack process, stealthy attacks can be composed of three preceding phases: (1)
stealthiness at communication, (2) stealthiness at execution, (3) stealthiness at propagation
[158].
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Phase 1

Phase 2

Attack Preparation Attack Execution
(Communication)
(Execution)

Phase 3
Attack Impact
(Propagation)

Access to entry
points

Attack delivery

Cyber-physical
interaction

Data capture

Execution

Physical impact

Develop attack

Figure 5.3 Stealthiness in an attack process

For the insider attacks considered in this dissertation, the stealthy condition in the Phase 1 is
to get access to the targeted communication channel and compromise the data while not being
detected by the network intrusion detection schemes and firewalls. In the Phase 2, the attacker
delivers the attack (tampering data) from the cyber space to the system. The stealthy condition
for this phase is that the attack cannot trigger any alarms before the attack goal is achieved.
The last phase of stealthiness means that the attack has achieved the attack goal successfully
before being detected.

5.4.1.2

Stealthy conditions

Given an adversary has the access to the system and knowledge of the network and can inject
false sensor readings and manipulate the state variables. Under this assumption, the adversary
has already achieved stealthiness in the phases of communication and attack execution. It is
necessary to analyze the stealthiness of the attack propagation phase.
There are two types of stealthy conditions at the propagation stage: (1) spatial stealthy
conditions and (2) temporal stealthy conditions.
One simple cyber-physical attack is to add a nonzero attack vector a ( k ) to the original sensor
measurements vector y ( k ) . The observed sensor measurement y ( k ) can be manipulated as
y (k )  y ( k )  a ( k ) . If the anomaly detection scheme in the system is based on the norm of the
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residual, the tampered measurements y ( k ) would be indistinguishable from the nominal
values y ( k ) . As a result, the attack would be undetectable.
For both the deception attack and false-data injection attack, an attack will only be detected
when the residual of the anomaly alarm system exceeds the detection threshold. Therefore,
stealthiness of the attacks is dependent of the detection schemes employed in the system.

5.4.1.2.1

Spatial stealthy attack

A spatial stealthy attack usually takes advantage the coupling relationship among the physical
process variables to bypass the anomaly detection schemes.
Let yˆ a (k )  C ( xˆ (k )   ) be the output estimation when an attack is under way,  is the error of
the state estimation caused by the attack.
The residual under attacks can be calculated as
ra ( k )  y ( k )  yˆ a ( k )
 y ( k )  a (k )  C ( xˆ ( k )   )
 y ( k )  Cxˆ ( k )  ( a ( k )  C )
 y ( k )  yˆ (k )  (a ( k )  C )

(5.18)

 r ( k )  ( a ( k )  C )

When the attack is designed as a(k )  C , ra (k )  r (k ) , the residual under the attack ra (k ) is
the same as the residual r (k ) under a normal operation. This means that the attack is
camouflaged in the system measurements. The attack will not cause any deviations in the
system estimation and therefore will not be detected by the anomaly detection scheme.

5.4.1.2.2

Temporal stealthy attack

A temporal stealthy attack usually hides its deviation to make the observed output adopts to
the dynamics of the system [159]. Stuxnet replay attack is an example of such an attack.
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Given that the attacker has the knowledge of the model, the attacker can simulate the system
output based on this model, and then use the simulated output to deceive the detection scheme.
Since the simulated output and sending input satisfy the control law, the residual will always
be zero. Consequently, arbitrary data can be injected into the system without affecting residuals.
A temporal stealthy attack can be described as
x (k  1)  Ax(k )  B (u ( k )  au (k ))
y (k )  Cx (k )  a y (k )

(5.19)

where a y (k ) is given by
xa (k  1)  Ax(k )  Bua (k )
a y (k )  Cxa (k )

(5.20)

where ua (k )  u (k )  au (k ) .

5.4.2 Impact analysis of insider attacks

5.4.2.1 Analysis by attack trees
The impact of an insider attack on the system can been analyzed using attack trees. Details
about attack trees has been discussed in Chapter 3.
Recall that vulnerability vector of each path can be expressed as:

V ( P(i))  v(0), v(1),, G

(5.21)

In order to identify the vulnerabilities, all the nodes and variables need to be analyzed along
each attack path.

86

5.4.2.2 Similarities and differences among attack patterns
The purpose to analyze the features of attacks is to analytically identify system vulnerabilities
relating to the attacks from a system and control perspective. Based on the identified
vulnerabilities, an effective defensive strategy can be developed.
In this section, similarities and differences of the above attack methods are summarized as an
input for the design of subsequent attack defensive schemes. The above two attack methods
have the same goals, namely to disrupt the integrity of the system without being detected. All
of them are constrained by the safe operating boundaries. They all require knowledge of the
system in terms of models, interactions, and inside attackers’ resources for the targeted system.
Although their attack methods are different, their final goals are the same.
In an attack tree, some vulnerabilities are used in different attack paths. These vulnerabilities
can be identified and used to design anomaly detection schemes. Furthermore, common attack
paths and attack steps can be established by using the collected similarities of different attack
scenarios.

5.5 Case studies
5.5.1 Experimental setup
To demonstrate the proposed methodology, case studies are conducted on the security platform
developed in Chapter 4. In this section, NPCTF architecture is analyzed first to identify system
vulnerabilities. Then, two stealthy attack scenarios are analyzed. One is to illustrate the impact
of a temporal stealthy false-data injection attack on sensors. The other is to illustrate the impact
of a spatial replay attack on sensors and actuators.

5.5.1.1 System model
The selected system is the heater control loop on NPCTF, as shown in Figure 4.13. In the
heater control loop, the safety limit of T2 is set at 37℃, the residual magnitude is set to be
0.5℃, the change rate is less than 0.05℃/s.
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A model of the physical system is identified as a first order transfer function:

T2  k  1  0.8T2  k   3.347C2 (k )  2.0556T1 (k )  1.59 F1 (k )

(5.22)

The prediction of T̂2 is computed online based on a Kalman filter estimation method.

Tˆ2  k  1  0.8Tˆ2  k   3.347C2 (k )  0.67(T2  k   Tˆ2  k )  2.0556T1 (k )  1.59 F1 ( k ) (5.23)
The detection system is

 Accept H 0 if

Detection  
 Accept H1 if

Tˆ2  T2  0.5
Tˆ2  T2  0.5

(5.24)

5.5.1.2 Analysis of attack scenarios and stealthy condition analysis
Assume that an attacker has managed to gain access to the communication network between
the sensors and the PLC via the activation switch, and subsequently modified the data packets
being sent to PLC. In other words, the PLC is spoofed with the tampered temperature reading.
The attacker’s goal is to tamper the sensor measurement of T2 to drive critical system variables
out of the safety limit before an alarm is triggered. Two attack scenarios are implemented to
test the effectiveness of the proposed detection methods.
The first scenario is a false-data injection attack. The attacker tampers the sensor reading from
T2 to the controller by injecting a negative deviation to the actual value. The attack is described
can be modeled as:
T2 ( k )  T2 ( k )  a y ( k )
a y ( k )  0.03( k  80)

(5.25)
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The system is at the steady operating state when this attack is injected. This negative term will
deceive the controller to increase the power of the heater to regulate the system back to the
steady state, herein causing the actual temperature T2 rise to go beyond the safety limit. This
attack is temporal stealthy by hiding its deviation within the safety threshold.
The second scenario is a replay attack. Before the attack is launched, the transient history
T2 ' ( k ) of the heater control loop is recorded when the setpoint of T2 changes from 30℃ to 25℃.

The attack is formulated as:

T (k )  T2 (k )
Step I:  2
a(k )  0

k  70

T ( k )  T2 ' ( k )
Step II:  2
70  k  200
'
 a ( k )  T2 ( k )  T2 ( k )

(5.26)

(5.27)

When the control loop is at the steady-state for its setpoint T2 =30℃, the actual T2 is replaced
with a recorded historical data. The replayed historical data deceives the controller to make
wrong control actions and cause damage to the system. Since the historical data satisfies the
safety threshold and the physical laws governing the heater, the attack will not be detected. It
achieves spatial stealthy.

5.5.1.3 Analysis using an attack tree
The above two attack scenarios have been examined to generate an attack tree for the heater
control system. Two attack scenarios were obtained by corrupting the measurement signal T2
from the attack tree in Figure 5.4. Based on the experiment and attack tree, the insider attack
pattern, attack path, and attack impact on the control loop are analyzed effectively.
For the false-data injection attack, the attack path is: P(1)  v0, v1, v 2, v3, G .
For the replay attack, the attack path is: P(2)  v0, v1, v7  v4, v5, v6, G .
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G: Attack goal

OR

AND
v3: Heater
controller

v6: Modified C2

v5:Entry point
A2

v7: Recorded
T2

Insider attack

v4: Control signal
C2

v2: Tampered T2

v1:Entry point
A1

v0: Sensor
measurement T2

Figure 5.4 Attack tree analysis of the two attack scenarios

Based on the attack tree, attack patterns of these two attacks are analyzed to extract their
similarities and differences in Section 5.5.3.

90

5.5.2 Experimental results
The steps of a false-data injection attack and a replay attack are further described in Table 5.1.
The propagation diagram of these attacks and their impacts on the heater behavior are shown
in Figure 5.5.
In the false data injection attack, the attacker tampers with the actual T2 slightly to deceive the
controller, while keeping the magnitude of the residual within the threshold 0.5℃. Results of
the false data injection attack is demonstrated in Figure 5.6. It can be observed that when the
actual T2 exceeds its safety limit of 37℃ at 251s, the deceived T2 sent to the PLC is only 27℃.
The anomaly detection scheme is not triggered, and the attack goal has been achieved. As such,
a sophisticated attacker can spoof the measurement data to fit the physics of the system, while
still driving the critical system variable out of the safety limit unsuspiciously.
Table 5.1 Steps for mounting insider attacks on the heater control loop
Attack steps

FDI attack action

ATKS_1

Access to the network

Network compromised

ATKS_2

Port scanning

Network compromised

ATKS_3

Capturing communication data packets

Information eavesdropped

ATKS_4

Parsing data packets

Information compromised

Creating authenticated
ATKS_5

packets from Attack
Scenario Generation
Module to PLC

Replay attack action

Recording a period of
data and prepare to
send to PLC

Impact on the system

Communication protocol
compromised

ATKS_6

Triggering the attack

Vulnerabilities exploited

ATKS_7

Launching the attack scenario

Vulnerabilities exploited

ATKS_8

False-data injection to

Replay the recorded

PLC

data to PLC

Data manipulated

ATKS_9

Deceive PLC to increase T2

PLC deceived

ATKS_10

Hiding impact of attacks

PLC deceived

ATKS_11

Safety limit exceeded

ATKS_12

Attack end

Triggering shutdown
system
System disrupted
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Preparation

Execution of the attack

Attack sequence

ATKS_1

Physical damage
ATKS_12

ATKS_2

ATKS_11

ATKS_3

ATKS_8

ATKS_9

ATKS_4

ATKS_7

ATKS_10

ATKS_5
ATKS_6
Time (s)

Figure 5.5 Attack process analysis

Figure 5.6 A false-data injection attack on the sensor
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Results of the replay attack is shown in Figure 5.7. In order to keep the replay attack stealthy,
in the early stage of the attack, the replayed data is chosen to be the actual data. When the
changes start at k=78s, the controller is deceived by the attacks to make a wrong command to
increase T2 . Results have shown that when the actual T2 is beyond its limit at k=163s, the
system haven’t identified any anomalies. The attack has achieved its desired attack goal.
Results demonstrate that the proposed method is effective to analyze system vulnerabilities
related to insider attacks and extract steps of these attacks on physical processes. These results
can be used for assessing the extent of cyber-physical attacks and for designing potential attack
detection and defense mechanisms.

Figure 5.7 A replay attack on the sensor
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5.5.3 Analysis of similarities and differences based on attack pattern
The similarities and differences for the two stealthy attack scenarios are analyzed according to
the tuple of the attack pattern AP  Gs , Rs , Cs , M , P .
(1) Attack goals Gs
Two different scenarios share the same attack goals, i.e., drive the outlet temperature of the
heater beyond the safety limit.
(2) Resources Rs
False-data injection attacks need disruption resources to obtain sensor measurements, the
replay attack still needs the knowledge of the control loop playing back the recordings.
(3) Attack stealth conditions Cs
Both attacks have the same constraints for keeping their acts undetected.
(4) Attack mode M
While their attack methods are different, it should be mentioned that both the false-data
injection attack path and the replay attack path use the same entry point A1 and goes to the
same target G.
(5) Attack paths and steps P
The attack paths and steps are different for each scenario, but they have some common attack
steps along different paths. These common steps would be considered as the critical steps.
From the simulation results and analysis, the characteristics of insider attacks can be analyzed
in both the physical and cyber domains. The attack patterns, including insider attack strategies
and attack paths, can be extracted effectively using the proposed framework. The goal of the
insider attack can be achieved while keeping the attack process stealthy. It can be seen from
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the attack tree that one attack scenario may be executed using different attack paths, and that
different attack scenarios may use the same attack path.

5.6 Conclusions
A detailed analysis and formulation of insider attacks are described in this chapter to
characterize the insider attacks and to identify vulnerabilities that the insider attack could use
to disrupt physical process from a cyber space. There are two main conclusions drawn from
this research:
First, a formulation methodology for insider attacks can be analyzed by attack patterns, which
are defined by the adversary’s goal, attack mode, attack path, attack resources, and attack
constraints. To understand impacts of an insider attack, features have been captured and
analyzed. A generic attack pattern for insider attacks, applicable to different attack scenarios,
has been modeled and analyzed to characterize the essential features of insider attacks.
Second, stealthy conditions of insider attacks are analyzed from temporal and spatial
perspectives. To capture the mapping relationship between cyber-physical attacks and the
resulting impacts on physical process, impact analysis can be performed using attack tree
methods. Data-tampering attack scenarios including deception attack, replay attack, and false
data injection attack are formulated and analyzed using the proposed framework.
With this proposed formulation methodology for insider attacks, it is possible to understand
and to model insider cyber-physical attacks against CPSs, and to analyze impacts of these
attacks, hence helping to strengthen the security of cyber-physical systems.
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Chapter 6

6

Cross-layered Anomaly Detection of Insider Attacks

6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5, security issues with respect to insider attacks have been discussed. Due to cyberphysical interactions and unique nature of insider attacks, an adversary is assumed to have the
resources and authorized access to tamper the sensor and actuator data in a stealthy way.
Traditional attack detection methods, such as firewalls, network intrusion detection methods
may be ineffective to insiders who have legitimate access to the networks. To secure such
systems, it is imperative is to detect and determine any anomalies caused by insider attacks
before they lead to unacceptable consequences in the physical process. This chapter will
investigate the situation and develop corresponding methods to detect any anomalies caused
by stealthy insider attacks.
Anomaly detection schemes can be categorized into three facets according to three CPS layers:
(1) the cyber layer; (2) the physical process; and (3) the cyber-physical interactions. Using the
information of the cyber layer, one can create preventive measures to potential attacks. With
the knowledge of the physical process, one can analyze and mitigate potential effects of attacks.
By observing the cyber-physical interactions, it is possible to detect potential cyber-physical
anomalies.
In this chapter, a cross-layered anomaly detection framework is developed and implemented
with the focus on sensor and actuator data tampering by an insider attack. The detection scheme
can identify the anomalies by analyzing the observed data in the cyber layer, transmitted data
in the cyber-physical layer and process data in the physical layer.
This chapter considers anomaly detection of data tampering attacks on sensor data and control
signals. Please note, since the insider attacker has authorized access to the system and has
knowledge of the system, access control strategies, such as encryption, are not within the scope
in this work.
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The organization of this chapter is as follows:
1) Development of a general framework for cross-layered detection scheme;
2) Design two detection algorithms to recognize the anomalies both in temporal and spatial
dimension.
3) Evaluation of the proposed framework and methods by performing case studies on the
experimental security assessment platform.

6.2 Problem formulation
6.2.1 System model
The mathematical models of a cyber-physical system under insider attacks can be described as

x(k  1)  Ax(k )  B(u(k )  au (k ))
y(k )  Cx(k )
y (k )  Cx(k )  ay (k )

(6.1)

The attack au (k )   m , a y (k )   p are added to actuators and sensors, y ( k ) is the sensor
signal on the physical side, y ( k ) is the sensor data received on the cyber side.
Assume that a set of attack sequences can be written as
au :  auT (0) auT (1)  auT (k ) 

T

a y :  aTy (0) aTy (1)  aTy (k ) 

T

(6.2)

These attack sequences can cause some critical system variables to go out of its normal range.
The objective of an anomaly detection scheme is to recognize anomalies caused by such attack
sequences.
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6.2.1.1 Safety set
When a system is attacked, the first task is to secure the physical process in a safe state. The
safety of the physical process can be defined by a set of boundaries on the process variables.
If all the variables are inside of the boundaries, it is said that the system is safe, otherwise, the
system is in unsafe state. A concept of safety boundary is described in Figure 6.1.
Definition 6.1: Safety boundary
A safety boundary  can be defined by a set of constraints given by
(6.3)

  {i ( x(k ))  0 | i  0,1,, h}
where h is the number of boundaries.
xj(k)

Unsafe state

i ( x(k ))  0
𝒙 𝒌
Safe state
Safety boundary

xi(k)

Figure 6.1 Definition of a safety boundary
Define  i as the distance between the system specific variables and a predefined safety
boundary at the sampled instant k

 i  sig (k ) x | ( x ( k ))0  x
i

(6.4)
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where sig ( k )  1 if x (k ) is inside the safety boundary, sig ( k )  1 if x(k ) is outside the safety
boundary.
Definition 6.2: Residual

Let xˆa ( k ) be the state estimate of the system when the system is under attack. Then, the
dynamics of the estimator can be represented as:
xˆa (k  1)  Axˆa (k )  Bu (k )  L( y (k  1)  CAxˆa (k )  CBu (k ))
yˆ (k  1)  CAxˆa (k )  CBu (k )

(6.5)

where y ( k  1) is the sensor data received on the cyber side, L is an observer gain.
While the system is being attacked, the residual between the compromised data and the
estimated data can be defined as
r ( k  1) : y ( k  1)  yˆ ( k  1)

(6.6)

Definition 6.3: Safety set

At a time instant k, a subset S (k ) is assigned as a safety set given by



S (k )  r : r (k )
where ∥. ∥ with 1

𝑝

p





(6.7)

∞ is the specified safety metrics,  is a predefined threshold for the

safety set.
For a stealthy attack, before the attacker reaches the final target, the tampered data are kept
within the safety boundary to avoid being detected.

6.2.1.2 Faults and attacks
The detection problems of insider attacks in cyber-physical systems have some similarities
with that of faults from sensors and actuators. Faults and attacks can both seen as threats that
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will have impacts on physical processes. Therefore, many fault detection and isolation
techniques can be used to detect the adverse effects of insider attacks.
However, there are some conceptual differences between faults and attacks, traditional faults
detection and isolation methods cannot be directly applied to detect insider attacks. The most
distinct difference is that a fault is considered as a non-colluding physical event that occurs in
components of the system randomly, while an attack often happens in the cyber layer and
causes effects in the physical process with an malicious intent. An fault happens in a specific
component and cannot disappear before the component is repaired or replaced, while an attack
can be performed in many potential points and in a coordinated and stealthy way, and it can
happen and disappear according to the attack scenarios. The impact of a fault is merely on
physical processes, while an attack can affect the transmitted both in cyber and physical layers.
These differences motivate the need to address cross-layer detection problems in a cyberphysical system.

6.2.2 Anomaly detection problem
From the equation (5.2), it can be seen that the attack impacts will be reflected on the output
sequences y (0), y (1), , y ( k ) , regardless the attack is on the sensor data or the actuator data.
Therefore, it is possible to detect anomalies from the sensor measurements.
Given that the set of received output sequences at time k on the cyber side can be described as:
Y ( k )  ( y1 ( k ), y 2 ( k ), , y n ( k ))

(6.8)

The detection problem can be stated as: to detect a possible change in Y (0), Y (1),, Y (k ) with
the minimum time and to determine if there is an anomaly.
The decision of the anomaly detection scheme can be formed in a hypothesis: normal
hypothesis ( H 0 ) and attack hypothesis ( H1 ).
There are two aspects need to be considered for this detection problem:
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1) Development of a cross-layered framework to deal with anomalies in multiple layers; and
2) Design of diverse detection algorithms to identify these anomalies and to issue an alarm.

6.3 Design of a cross-layered anomaly detection scheme
To recognize anomalies in a multi-layers CPS, it is necessary to consider data in different
layers to determine the detection rules, that is, a cross-layered detection scheme. This chapter
will develop a cross-layered detection framework and design corresponding detection
algorithms.

6.3.1 Cross-layered detection framework
The proposed detection system utilizes a defense-in-depth concept to detect anomalies, as is
shown in Figure 6.2. It integrates the cyber data, network data and process data to provide a
cross-layer detection. It employs three different detection algorithms across the three layers.
The first layer is a traditional rule-based intrusion detection method, to prevent external
intruders and limit the resources available to inside attackers. Insiders may bypass this
detection layer in some situations. The second layer is in the cyber-physical layer, a data-driven
algorithm is proposed to detect the anomalies among the transmitted data. The data flow
transmitted in the cyber-physical network and the inherent physical laws of the process system
are integrated for detection in this layer. The third layer is in the physical layer, a model-based
state estimation algorithm and a temporal-based detection algorithm are proposed to detect
anomalies in the physical processes.
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Figure 6.2 A cross-layered anomaly detection framework

A detailed flowchart of the proposed anomaly detection scheme is shown in Figure 6.3. In
order to find the anomalies caused by attacks as early as possible, the scheme reads both
network and process data online, performs different detection methods in multiple layer, and
identifies if there are any abnormal changes to the data.
Due to the distinct differences between attacks and faults, this detection framework considers
a cross-layered detection scheme, which is also different from the traditional fault detection
and isolation techniques that only consider the physical layers. For a fault detection scheme,
only D3 is considered, which is not sufficient nor effective to detect insider attacks.
The proposed detection scheme provides a cross-layered detection framework: D1 is focused
on the network intrusion detection to provide the initial detection of attacks. D2 integrates the
data both in physical layer and physical layer to identify the anomalies among the cyberphysical interactions in case that D1 fails, which is different from the traditional fault detection
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methods. D3 is originated from a traditional method, which provides the anomaly detection in
the physical process. In this chapter, the focus is on the development of the second and third
layers in the proposed detection framework.
Please note that, although the proposed detection framework is for detection of attacks, the
model-based detection system in the third layer in this chapter can also be used to detect
anomalies from both attacks and faults.

6.3.2 Cross-layered detection methods
Based on the discussion in Chapter 5, insider attacks attempt to keep the attack stealthy using
known information about the spatial and temporal-based knowledge of the system. To reveal
the anomalies by stealthy attacks, two diverse methods are designed. One is a model-based
method for temporal anomalies, in which the accumulated residuals of the compromised
measurements are calculated and evaluated. The other is data-driven method to detect spatial
anomalies, in which patterns of variables are learned and analyzed.

6.3.2.1 Model-based anomaly detection
A model-based anomaly detection method can detect malicious deviations by comparing the
expected process behavior with the received process data. Most of the model-based detection
methods are based on residuals, and only the current state of the system is considered. In this
chapter, a state estimation-based CUSUM method that takes into account both the current state
and the history state is used for anomaly detection.
The basic idea of this detection scheme is demonstrated in Figure 6.4. The scheme consists of
three stages: state prediction, residual generation, and anomaly detection. The state of the
process is predicted based on the process model, residuals are generated based on the estimated
data and the measured data, and the cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithm is used to process
the residuals and detect the anomalies.
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Figure 6.3 Flow chart of the proposed methodology
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Figure 6.4 Functional elements in a model-based anomaly detection

To formalize the anomaly detection problem, the detection algorithm–a nonparametric
cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithm [162] is as follows: if the historical output sequence of
the physical system y (k  1) and the current control input sequence u (k ) and their relationship
are known, the residual can be generated by comparing the predicted output yˆ (k ) with the
measured sensor output y (k ) , and then anomalies caused by attacks through tampering with
the sensor data can be potentially detected based on the residuals.
1) State prediction

This step is to provide an prediction of the system. In this dissertation, a Kalman filter is used
to estimate the system state and predict the system output. The Kalman filter algorithm is listed
in the following [93].
xˆ (k  1)  Axˆ (k )  Bu (k )  LD
L  P  (k )C T (CP  (k )C T  R) 1
D  y (k  1)  CAxˆ (k )  CBu (k )


(6.9)

P (k )  AP (k  1) A  Q
T

P (k )  ( I  LC ) P  (k )
where L is Kalman gain, P ( k ) is the covariance of state vector estimate, P  ( k ) is the error
covariance ahead, Q is the process noise covariance, and R is measurement noise covariance.
The output can be predicted based on the current estimation can be calculated as:
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yˆ ( k  1)  CAxˆ ( k )  CBu ( k )

(6.10)

This estimation method takes into account of the historical output when predicting the future
output.

2) Residual computation
Define norm of the residual y (k )  yˆ (k ) as the detected sequence. When there are no attacks,

y (k )  yˆ (k ) is identically to be zero.
Considering the measurement noise and error of the process model, under normal operation

y (k )  yˆ (k ) is normally less than a predefined value.
In order to reduce false alarm rate, a positive constant b is used as an offset to compensate the
measurement noises and errors of process models.
The offset residual can be represented as:

z (k )  y (k )  yˆ (k )  b

(6.11)

3) Computation of b
Given that bmin is the averaged residual computed using historical data of the physical process
under the normal operation, b is selected to be larger than bmin .
bmin  E  y ( k )  yˆ ( k ) 

(6.12)

4) CUSUM parameters
Based on the offset residual in Equation (6.11), a nonparametric CUSUM is calculated as

S (k )  (S (k  1)  z (k )) , S (0)  0

(6.13)
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where S ( k ) is cumulative sum of the offset residuals, ( S (k  1)  z (k ))  is the max of
(0, S ( k  1)  z ( k )) .

The corresponding decision rule becomes

 H S (k )  
Detection Logic   0
 H1 S ( k )  

(6.14)

where  is a threshold selected based on the false alarm rate.
The observation y ( k ) starts under normal operation hypothesis H 0 . When the CUSUM
surpasses the threshold, the detection scheme changes to hypothesis H1 to raise an anomaly
alarm.
A false alarm is when the detection scheme identifies the observed data as an anomaly, but the
activity is a normal behavior.
From Equation (6.11) - (6.14), the time to detect an attack (detection time) increases as b
increases, but false alarm rate decreases .
From Equation (6.14), the threshold  of CUSUM method presents a trade-off between the
detection time and the false alarm rate. The false alarm rate decreases as  increases, but the
detection time will increase as well.

6.3.2.2 Data-driven clustering-based detection
Although the model-based detection method can predict system outputs and detect anomalies,
they require an accurate model of the physical process, which is often not available. To address
this issue, a data-driven clustering-based detection method is proposed. The clustering-based
detection method is based on historical dynamic behaviors. They can capture the correlations
or relationships among variables and check the data consistency to identify anomalies of the
system.
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The clustering approach classiﬁes measurements into several groups, each group is called a
cluster. Within a cluster, the data shares similar patterns. Outliers are defined as the data that
does not belong to the predefined clusters. The inputs to the clustering algorithm are the
measurement data. The output of the clustering algorithm is a subset containing a speciﬁc
operating state of the physical system.
A flow chart of the clustering detection scheme can be summarized in Figure 6.5. The detection
algorithm [78] is described as follows.
Define N as the total number of observations of y , l as the number of clusters, m as the number
of data in a cluster, C (i ) as cluster i, and y ( j ) as the vector of observations at moment j.

(1) Data collection
Start

Data collection

(3) Clustering assessment and anomaly detection
Clusters
1,2,…, l
Define radius Ri and
compute centroid of
cluster i

Collect number of data
in each cluster: n(i)

Yes

n (i)>m

No

Data pattern
selection/extraction
Data normalization

Compute distance di
of each data to the
centroid in cluster i

di>Ri

Yes
Outliers

No

Clustering algorithm

Normal

Define minimum
number m of data in
a normal cluster
(2) Data processing

Under attack

H0
H1

Figure 6.5 Data-driven clustering-based detection method

Detection
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1) Cluster extraction
The clustering detection method collects the raw data under normal operation and trains the
data for clustering. The purpose of this step is to get the parameters for the clustering.
The centroid Ci and radius Ri of a cluster is defined and computed as:

Ci 
Ri 

1
N

N

 y( j )
j 1

1
N

(6.15)

N

 ( y( j)  C )
j 1

2

i

where Ri denotes the average distance of all measurements to the centroid Ci .
For a set of measurement data, l clusters will be generated according to the computed centroids
and radius.

2) Cluster classification
In this step, the detection scheme collects the measurement data online and partitions them
into l clusters. Each data belongs to a cluster with the nearest centroids.
Given that n(i) measurements are selected as the initial cluster C (i ) . If n(i )  m , the selected
cluster meet the required minimum number of data in a cluster. Otherwise, it is treated as an
outlier.
For each initialized cluster, the Euclidean distance between the measurement and the centroid
is calculated as:
di  y ( j )  Ci

Outliers can be classified by comparing the distance di with the radius Ri of the cluster.

3) Anomaly detection

(6.16)
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For the anomaly detection, various operational states are classified into different clusters, the
clustering detection algorithm evaluates the clusters and provides a binary classification as H 0
normal or H1 abnormal. In this chapter, clusters are classified as two categories: (1) Cluster 1
for normal operating state, and (2) Cluster 2 for abnormal state.

6.4 Case studies
This section presents case studies and performance analysis of the proposed anomaly detection
framework with two detection algorithms.
A security platform on NPCTF environment as implemented in Chapter 4 is used. The same
heater control loop as shown in Figure 4.13 is used. The safety limit of T2 is set to be lower
than 37℃, and the change rate is set to be less than 0.05℃/second.

6.4.1 Experimental setup
The experiment scenarios are outlined in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Case studies for the cross-layer detection scheme
Experimental scenarios
Stealthy false‐data injection (FDI) attack on T2
Attack scenarios

Stealthy replay attack on T2
Implementation of the cross‐layered anomaly detection

Detection methods

Model‐based CUSUM method
Data‐driven clustering method

6.4.1.1 Attack scenarios
Two stealthy attack scenarios have been implemented to test the effectiveness of the proposed
detection methods. The attacker’s goal is to tamper the sensor measurement of T2 to drive the
heater system out of the safe region before an alarm is triggered.
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The first scenario is to tamper the sensor data T2 going to the controller by injecting a negative
deviation Δ T2 = -0.02(k-25) to the actual value at k=25s. The system has been operating at the
steady state, when the attack is initiated. The deviation-0.02(k-25) will deceive the controller
to increase the power of the heater to regulate the system back to the desired steady state, herein
causing the rise of T2 beyond its safety limit. This attack is temporal stealthy because it hides
its deviation under the safety threshold.
The second scenario is a replay attack. Before the attack is launched, the transient response of
the heater control loop subjected to a change in the setpoint of T2 from 30℃ to 25℃ has been
recorded. When the control loop operates steadily at its setpoint T2 =30℃, the actual sensor
measurement of T2 is replaced with the recorded historical data. The controller will regulate
the system according to the replayed data, which then cause the heater to increase its power
and drives the actual T2 beyond its safety limit. Since the historical data satisfies the safety
threshold and the physical laws of the heater, this attack is essentially spatial stealthy.

6.4.1.2 Cross-layered detection scheme
The proposed cross-layer anomaly detection scheme is implemented aside the supervisory
station of NPCTF. It collects and processes the data online through an OPC client, it monitors
the networks through Snort, the sampling period is chosen to be 1 second. Rule-based method
in the first layer is implemented in the Snort environment, white lists are set to prevent network
intrusion from external attackers. A data-driven clustering-based detection method in the
second layer and a CUSUM detection method in the third layer are implemented in MATLAB
environment. The data-driven detection scheme triggers an alarm when outliers are classified
as an abnormal cluster. The model-based detection scheme arises an anomaly alarm after the
detection variable goes beyond a specific threshold calculated in term of CUSUM.

1) Parameters in the model-based detection algorithm

111

To implement the proposed detection framework in Figure 6.1, selection of the CUSUM
parameters are described as follows.
The following model is used to estimate the system state by using a Kalman filter.

T2  k  1  0.8T2  k   3.347C2 (k )  2.0556T1 (k )  1.59 F1 (k )

(6.17)

where T2  k  is the outlet temperature of the heater, T1 (k ) is the inlet temperature of the heater,
C2 (k ) is the current of the heater, F1 (k ) is the water flow rate of the heater.
The prediction of Tˆ2 (k ) is computed online based on a Kalman filter method.

Tˆ2  k  1  0.8Tˆ2  k   3.347C2 (k )  L(T2  k   Tˆ2  k )  2.0556T1 (k )  1.59 F1 (k )
L  P  (k )( P  (k )  R) 1

(6.18)



P (k )  0.64 P( k  1)  Q
P(k )  (1  L) P  ( k )
where P(0)=0, Q  4 104 , and R=0.25.
For the parameters in CUSUM method, in order to select a suitable value for b, the residual
Tˆ2 (k )  T2 (k ) between the estimation Tˆ2 (k ) and sensor measurement T2 ( k ) is computed
based on 24 hours of historical data under the normal operation, the empirical value of bmin is
computed to be 0.316℃, b is chosen to be 0.5 in the case studies.
The threshold  of CUSUM method is selected as 0.5℃.

2) Data-driven clustering-based detection algorithm
The proposed clustering-based detection method is implemented with N=200, m=30, l =
2. The steady state and transient state are trained in advance based on the historical data,
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the centroid for the normal state cluster is set to be 29.85℃, and the radius is calculated to be
0.5℃. The decision threshold is selected as 1℃.
Implementation of the proposed clustering detection scheme undertakes the detection of two
distinct clusters. The ﬁrst cluster reﬂects a normal steady-state operation, while the second
cluster reﬂects observations which may be attributed to attacks.
In order to reflect the nature of the clusters, a cluster index is defined as:
1, normal state
Cluster index  
.
2, abnormal state

3) Selection of evaluation metrics
To evaluate the proposed methods, detection effectiveness and detection time are considered
as the evaluation metrics. Detection effectiveness is evaluated if the attack is detected before
it has driven the critical system variables out of the safety set. Detection time is the time that
it takes to detect an anomaly caused by the attack.

6.4.2 Performance results

6.4.2.1 Detection results under a FDI attack
Results of the model-based detection method and data-driven detection method under a
stealthy FDI attack are shown in Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7, respectively.
The results in Figure 6.6 have demonstrated that the model-based detection scheme can detect
the anomaly effectively. The attack is injected at k=25s, the observed T2 is close to its
estimation to keep the attack stealthy. Although the residual is still within the threshold, the
cumulative sum of residuals has indicated an anomaly and arises the alarm at k =49s.
The results in Figure 6.7 have shown that the clustering-based method can also identify the
abnormal cluster at k =90s. When an attack is launched at k=25s, the observed measurements
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matches with the cluster of normal operation. As the deviation between the observed T2 and
the expected T2 increases, an abnormal cluster is declared.

Figure 6.6 Model-based anomaly detection under a FDI attack
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Figure 6.7 Clustering-based anomaly detection under a FDI attack

6.4.2.2 Detection results under a replay attack
Results of the model-based detection scheme under a replay attack is demonstrated in Figure
6.8. In order to be stealthy, the replayed data to the controller meets the steady operating
condition at the beginning of the attack. At k =85s, the recorded data starts to change from 30℃
to 25℃, while the controller still maintains the system at its setpoint T2 =30℃. Although the
replayed data T2 is still normal, the cumulative sum of the residuals recognizes that there is an
anomaly and raises the alarm at k =94s.
Results of the data-driven detection scheme under the replay attack are shown in Figure 6.9.
Experimental results have demonstrated that the data-driven detection scheme identiﬁes two
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clusters. The first cluster includes both steady-state and transient dynamics, the second cluster
is identified as abnormal states because the replayed data does not match the pre-defined steady
state. Since the replayed data comes from the historical data in normal state, the steady state at
30℃ is classified as a normal cluster. When replayed T2 starts to change from 30℃ to 25℃,
it is still within the radius at the beginning, hence the generated cluster is still considered as a
normal cluster. However, the replayed T2 already deviates significantly from the normal state
afterwards, the cluster index changes from normal to abnormal at k =120s, and the generated
cluster is classified to be abnormal and the alarm is triggered.

Figure 6.8 Model-based anomaly detection under a replay attack
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Figure 6.9 Clustering-based anomaly detection under a replay attack

6.4.2.3 Detection Effectiveness
Based on the defined security metrics, the results of the implemented detection methods are
summarized in Table 6.2. The results have shown that both detection methods are effective in
detecting attacks.

Table 6.2 Results of detection methods
Attack

Attack

Detection time

Detection effectiveness

scenario

start time

Model‐based

Data‐driven

Model‐based

Data‐driven

FDI attack

k=25s

k=49s

k=90s

Detected

Detected

Replay attack

k=75s

k=94s

k=120s

Detected

Detected

117

Model-based detection method arises the alarm soon after the data is tempered during the
attacks. The detection time of the data-driven clustering method is longer than that of the
model-based method, especially for a FDI attack. This is because that the injected FDI attack
generates a very small deviation at each time step, it is difficult for the clustering method to
classify the attacked data from the normal data in a short time. But for CUSUM methods, the
cumulative sum of the residuals includes the historical residuals, which is more effective than
clustering methods which use the current state of the system only.
In the case studies, the threshold  of CUSUM method is conservatively selected to be 0.5℃,
no false alarm is encountered during the experiments.

6.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, a cross-layered detection scheme is developed to detect anomalies caused by
different stealthy insider cyber-physical attacks. The detection scheme considers a hierarchical
approach by combining different detection methods in different layers to provide a defense-indepth detection against the attacks. In the proposed detection scheme, the first layer is a rulebased detection, only the authorized users can gain access to the system. The second layer
includes a data-driven clustering-based method, which is to identify anomalies from cyberphysical interactions. The third layer is a state estimation-based CUSUM method to detect the
anomalies based on physical process data. These methods work can together to provide a
defense-in-depth detection scheme.
Results have shown that the proposed detection scheme is effective in detecting insider attacks.
The model-based CUSUM detection method can detect anomalies quickly and effectively. For
situations where physical model of the system is difficult to be identified, data-driven approach
can provide with adaptivity and flexibility. These different detection methods can work
independently or can also be integrated to detect anomalies in multi-layers.
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Chapter 7

7

An Attack Defensive Scheme against Insider Attacks

7.1 Introduction
If an insider attack is launched on a cyber-physical system, a detection scheme should identify
the anomaly and alert the operators and activate attack mitigation strategies at the same time.
Attack mitigation system should then respond to the attack and secure the physical system in
a safe state during and after this attack. This chapter is focused on designing an attack defensive
framework to provide a defense-in-depth detection, response and mitigation strategies to
insider attacks.
In order to mitigate impacts of these attacks, an attack-resilience control is one that can react,
tolerate and reconfigure the system [103]. It is important for a cyber-physical system to
incorporate with some attack-resilient capabilities into its control systems so that the system
can be maintained to be within the safe operation range.
In this chapter, an attack-resilient control system is designed to mitigate the impacts of attacks.
The resilient control system includes an attack response scheme, a decision-making scheme,
and a bank of controllers. The attack response scheme responds to the detected anomalies. The
decision scheme enables the control system switch to a suitable controller in response to the
identified attack anomalies.
It is assumed that the supervisory layer is secure and could not be penetrated by the attacker.
The supervisory station is isolated from the rest of the system and is assumed to be secure. It
contains a control system and an anomaly detection scheme.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, an attack defensive framework is presented in
Section 7.2. Second, design of a resilient control system in response to an attack, a decisionmaking scheme and corresponding controllers are discussed in Section 7.3. Subsequently, case
studies are included to demonstrate the effectiveness in Section 7.4 and finally conclusions are
drawn in Section 7.5.
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7.2 An attack defensive framework
An effective defense-in-depth strategy requires a holistic approach to leverage all of the
resources in order to provide effective layers of protection against attacks [163]. In this section,
an attack defensive framework is proposed to address multi-layered defense strategies as
shown in Figure 7.1.
1. Attack Prevention
Firewalls

Security
boundary

2. Attack Detection
Cyber
Cyber-physical
detection
detection

Safety
thresholds

Physical
detection

3. Attack Response
Isolation

Redundancy

4. Attack Mitigation
DecisionAttack-resilient
making
control

Replace

Recovery

Figure 7.1 A defense-in-depth framework
There are four defense layers in the proposed framework. The first layer includes passive
prevention strategies against insider attacks, the second layer consists of active detection
techniques to recognize anomalies. The third layer contains responses to attacks, and the fourth
layer is composed of different attack-resilient control systems to mitigate attack impacts and
maintain system performance.
This attack-resilient control framework has a similar structure with a fault tolerant control
framework. However, due to the different features of faults and attacks, different defensive
approaches need to be considered. In general, a fault tolerant control may be achieved through
safety boundary control, physical process monitoring and repair and replacement of the
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physical components, respectively. On the other hand, an attack-resilient control system needs
to consider both the cyber and physical enhancements and addressing multi-layer security
issues. Within the proposed defensive framework, the focus includes both cyber security
enhancements and physical process control.
1) Attack prevention
Attack prevention aims to decrease the likelihood of attacks through a combination of multiple
approaches, such as security boundaries, firewalls and safety limits. These are performed
offline before the system is attacked.

2) Attack detection
For attacks that are not preventable, online detection methods can be applied to identify
anomalies caused by attacks. A cross-layered detection scheme has been considered in Chapter
6. A model-based detection method and a data-driven method can work together to provide a
defense-in-depth detection scheme.

3) Attack response
Once an attack is detected, the corrupted measurement data needs to be isolated and replaced.
In the current framework, the tampered data can be corrected through estimated measurements
or through redundant measurements.

4) Attack mitigation
Once an anomaly is detected and its nature is diagnosed, mitigation strategies can be taken to
reduce the attack impacts and maintain the system in a safe state. In the proposed framework,
attack mitigation can be achieved through a decision logic scheme and a set of attack-resilient
controllers.
It is worthwhile to mention that, in this framework, attack detection and prevention schemes
do not affect normal operations of the system, only attack response and attack mitigation
strategies can reconfigure the system. For a safety-critical system, even if the system is
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maintained within a safe state by a mitigation scheme, the employed attack response scheme
and resilient control strategy are still considered as a temporary solution before a human
operator reacts to the anomaly detection alarm.
This chapter is focused on design of attack responses and mitigation strategies to secure the
cyber-physical system in an event of an attack.

7.3 Design of an attack-resilient control system
Given the existence of an attack, one of the important requirements for safety-critical systems
is to be attack resilient. Thus, design of an attack-resilient control system has two objectives.
One is to isolate the corrupted data from the attacks, the other one is to reduce its attack impacts
and maintain the system safety and performance at an acceptable degree.

7.3.1 Attack response scheme
Attack response is a follow-up action soon after the detection scheme arises an alarm, it means
that the measurement data might have been corrupted. An attack response scheme has to
evaluate the consequence of the attack and to isolate the tampered data to prevent further
damages to the system.

H1

yˆ (k )
Detection

yc ( k )  yˆ ( k )
Attack Response

y (k )
H0

yc ( k )

Resilient
control

u (k )

yc ( k )  y ( k )

Figure 7.2 A conceptual diagram of the attack response scheme
Given that the state estimation yˆ ( k ) is available, an attack response scheme is shown in Figure
7.2. It consists of two sequences of measurements, one is the estimated output yˆ ( k ) and the
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other is the measured signal y ( k ) . Once an attack is detected (H1), the scheme will replace the
measurement y ( k ) by the estimated data yˆ ( k ) to the controller instead.
Since there is a risk of false alarms in the detection scheme, it is important to make sure that
the estimated output yˆ ( k ) will not cause safety concerns to rest of the system. Therefore, this
proposed attack response method can only be considered as a temporary solution to isolate the
potential attacks before a human operator confirms and responds to the situation.
Another potential solution is to add redundant communication and measurement channels for
safety-critical variables, which are independent of the current networks and measurements.
When an attack happens, these redundancies can be used to correct the corrupted data which
is sent to the controller.
One difference between a fault isolation and an attack response scheme is redundancy
consideration. In a fault isolation scheme, redundant components in physical process are
considered, while redundant communication channels are considered in an attack response.

7.3.2 Resiliency in mitigation
Once the anomalies are detected, an attack-resilient control scheme should be triggered. Since
insider attacks also have impacts on physical processes, fault-tolerant control can be applied
to attack-resilient control scheme.
Since attacks are difficult to predict and may drive system to various dangerous conditions, the
focus of this section is on design of an attack-resilient control scheme to mitigate anomalies
resulted from an attack. There are two aspects to be considered in the design an attack-resilient
control scheme: one is a decision-making scheme to determine which control mode should be
activated to defend the attack; the other is the designing of corresponding controller to realize
the control objectives. A design diagram of a resilient control system is shown in Figure 7.3.
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Resilient
controller

Control mode n

Physical process

Figure 7.3 Structure of an attack-resilient control system
The decision-making scheme can be designed based on multiple criteria: safety, security and
system performance [156]. Based on the replaced or corrected data from the attack response
scheme, the decision-making scheme will analyze the security and safety conditions and
determine a control mode to mitigate the attack. With a switchable control mode, the controller
can mitigate the attack and maintain the system performance in an acceptable degree.
In this chapter, a decision-making scheme is designed based on current safety region of the
system once an attack is detected. There are three regions for a system state, as is shown in
Figure 7.4.
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Figure 7.4 Safety region for the decision-making scheme [155]
1) Safe region: in this region, the system is safe and there are no anomalies detected.
2) Resilient region: an anomaly has been detected while the system is in still safe state, the
detected anomaly can be mitigated through a resilient control method.
3) Unsafe region: an anomaly has been detected, while system is already in an unsafe state,
the detected anomaly is unacceptable. This is a forbidden region.
Based on the system state, there are three control modes that can be triggered by the decisionmaking scheme.
1) When the system is in the safe region, control mode #1 is used as a normal control. The
goal of the controller is to maintain the current performance without any reconfiguration.
2) When the system is in the resilient region, control mode #2 is triggered as a resilient control.
The goal of the controller is to mitigate system state back to the safe region or degrade the
system performance to reduce impacts of the attack.
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3) When the system is in the unsafe region, control mode #3 is triggered as an emergency
control. The goal of the controller is to take immediate actions to minimize damages to the
system.

7.3.3 Automated mitigation and supervised mitigation
As is mentioned in Section 7.2, the mitigation is considered as a temporary solution to protect
the system in case there are anomalies. There are two ways to perform the mitigation strategies.
One is automated mitigation, which means that the resilient control scheme will be triggered
automatically once an anomaly is detected. The other is supervised mitigation, in which the
security situation needs to be confirmed by a human operator when the detection scheme raises
an alarm, and then the proposed resilient control scheme will be activated if the operator
confirms the security situation.
Since there might be false rate of detection schemes, automated mitigation should ensure the
system variables are maintained within their safety limits. Otherwise the automated mitigation
may make a wrong decision on the controller selection.

7.4 Case studies
To validate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme, case studies are presented in this section.
System performance is analyzed based on the proposed defensive framework and a resilient
control on NPCTF. The heater control loop as described in Figure 4.13 is used again.

7.4.1 Experiment design
The purpose of the case studies is to experimentally validate the developed attack defensive
framework and resilient control techniques. The model and the state estimation of the heater
control system is given in Equation (6.17) and Equation (6.18) , details can be found in Section
6.4.1.2.

7.4.1.1 Attack scenarios
Two attack scenarios have been considered in this chapter.
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The first scenario (SA1) is a false-data injection attack on the sensor data of T2 (k ) . The
tampered data sent to the controller is

T (k )  0.03(k  30) k  30
T2 (k )   2
k  30
T2 (k )

(7.1)

The second scenario (SA2) is a replay attack. The tampered data sent to the controller is

T2 ' (k ) 70  k  200

T2 (k )  
T2 (k ) k  70

(7.2)

where T2 ' ( k ) is a set of recorded historical data on the transient response of T2 (k ) when the
setpoint is changed from 30℃ to 25℃.

7.4.1.2 Attack defensive framework
The attack defensive strategies are presented in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1 Implemented attack defensive strategies
Framework

Methods

Techniques

Attack prevention

D0

Safety limit and security boundary

D1

Rule-based network intrusion detection

D2

CUSUM method:

D3

Data-driven clustering-based method

R1

Attack response

M1

Decision-making unit

M2

Resilient controllers

Attack detection

Attack response
Attack mitigation

  1, b  0.5

1) Attack prevention D0
Two boundaries are set in this layer. One is the safety limit of T2 as 37℃, which is set within
the detection system; the other is the security boundary to prevent external or unauthorized
users, which is set in the firewalls inside the supervisory station.
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2) Attack detection
The cross-layered detection scheme is implemented in this framework, which includes three
detection methods referred as D1, D2 and D3.
D1 is a rule-based detection method, which is implemented in a Snort environment to define
the scope of the attack defined in this dissertation. The detection rules include a whitelist for
the authorized users and consistency monitoring of network traffics. This method can detect
network intrusions and interruptions to the system.
D2 and D3 are implemented with the same settings as in Section 6.4.1.2.

3) Attack response
R1 is an attack response scheme to react to the detection anomalies. Since there are no
redundant sensors and communication channels in the heater control loop, in order to isolate
the measurement data T2 ( k ) , the estimated Tˆ2 (k ) is used to replace T2 ( k ) instead when there
is an anomaly detected.
Measurement data to the controller T2 c ( k ) is set as

T2 (k ) H 0
T2 c (k )  
Tˆ2 (k ) H1

(7.3)

where the estimated temperature Tˆ2 (k ) is computed using Equation (6.18), T2 ( k ) is the
measured sensor data in the control side.
4) Attack mitigation

To mitigate impacts of an attack, the decision-making scheme needs to determine a resilient
control mode based on the detected anomalies, and trigger the corresponding controller. In this
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case, M1 is a decision-making unit, to decide which controller should be activated. M2 is a
set of PID controllers to mitigate the system back to a safe state.
Safety region of this case study is set to be:
a) Safe region: H 0 is true.
b) Resilient region: H1 is true, but T2 ( k ) and Tˆ2 (k ) are lower than 37 ℃
c) Unsafe region: H1 is true, and T2 ( k ) or Tˆ2 (k ) is higher than 37 ℃.
The decision-making logic in this case study has three control modes.
a) Control mode #1: normal control.
When there is no attack detected, normal control mode is selected. The observed data T2 ( k ) is
sent to the controller, a PD controller is employed with parameters K P  6.5, K D  1 .
b) Control mode #2: attack-resilient control.
When the system is in resilient region, an attack-resilient controller is selected to mitigate
impacts of the attack. The observed data T2 ( k ) is isolated first and the estimated Tˆ2 (k ) is sent
to the controller, a PID controller is employed to regulate the system back to its setpoint at
30 ℃. Parameters of the PID controller are K P  7.6, K I  0.1, K D  1
c) Control mode #3: emergency control.
When the system is in the unsafe state, an emergency control mode is triggered. Under this
situation, the heater will be shut down to avoid further damage, and the emergency control
system ECCS in NPCTF will be triggered to ensure that the physical process is safe.
In this case study, the false-data injection attack and the replay attack have been implemented
on the heater control system, respectively. The detection scheme including D0- D3 is used to
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detect anomalies. Attack response R1 is to respond to the attacks, and mitigation methods M1
and M2 are to mitigate the system. The proposed attack-resilient control system is reconfigured
in the supervisory station and then loaded into PLC in advance.

7.4.2 Experimental results
To study the effectiveness of the framework, the experiments are carried out under two cases.
The first case is an automated attack response and mitigation, in which all the defensive
strategies are executed automatically. The second case is a supervised attack response and
mitigation, which requires a human operator to confirm and release the response after an attack
is detected.

7.4.2.1 Automated attack response and mitigation
Performance of the proposed automated attack defensive scheme under two attack scenarios
have been demonstrated in Figure 7.5.
1) Results of automated mitigation to a FDI attack

The performance of the system when the sensor data of T2 is tampered by the stealthy falsedata injection attack is shown in Figure 7.5(a).
The FDI attack starts at t k=30s, the detection system detects the anomaly at k=54s. Although
the detection threshold has been exceeded at this time, the actual T2 ( k ) is still around its
setpoint, and is close to its estimation Tˆ2 (k ) . The automated attack response scheme replaces

T2 (k ) by the estimated Tˆ2 (k ) , and the resilient control system keeps T2 ( k ) in its steady state
despite of the attack.
2) Results of automated mitigation to a replay attack

The results of automated mitigation against a replay attack are shown in Figure 7.5(b). Before
the attack is launched, the replayed data is recorded in advance by the attacker. System is
operating at the steady state. At k=70s, the replay attack starts to send the historical data of T2

130

to the controller. At k=80s, the historical data starts to decrease the temperature from 30 ℃ to
25 ℃.

Figure 7.5 Performance of the automated attack-resilient control scheme

The detection system identifies this attack at k=93s, and the attack response scheme is triggered
to isolate the attacked T2 (k ) and the estimated Tˆ2 (k ) is used by the controller instead. Since
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the estimated Tˆ2 (k ) is close to the actual T2 ( k ) , it is relatively easy for the controller to
maintain the system in its safe region.
It can be observed that the automated attack response and mitigation strategies are effective
to eliminate the effects of these attacks and maintain the system performance.

7.4.2.2 Supervised attack response and mitigation
This case study involves three stages: (1)before an attack (normal operation), (2)during an
attack without mitigation (validation of detection effectiveness), and (3) during an attack with
mitigation (validation of mitigation effectiveness). Experimental results are shown in Figure
7.6.
1) Results of supervised mitigation to a FDI attack

Results of a supervised mitigation against the stealthy false-data injection attack are provided
in Figure 7.6(a).
As can be seen, prior to the launch of the attack, the measurement data of T2 is in its steady
state 30℃. At k=30s, a FDI attack is initialized to the process the tampered T2 decreases by a
deviation of -0.03 (k-30) ℃. No mitigation is used in the period from k=30s to k=100s, the
attacker deceives the controller to increase the power of the heater and drives the actual
temperature T2 higher than its setpoint. The attack is detected at k=56s and an operator confirms
this situation and responds to this attack shortly after.
To validate the effectiveness of the proposed defensive strategies, the resilient control system
is activated by the operator at k=100s. The measured T2 ( k ) is replaced by the estimated Tˆ2 (k ) ,
the resilient control mode is triggered. It can be seen that the actual T2 ( k ) is moving back to
its steady state at around 30 ℃ starting from k=126s. The resilient control scheme recovers the
system to its normal operating condition after the attack is detected and isolated.
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Figure 7.6 Performance of the supervised attack-resilient control scheme
2) Results of supervised mitigation to a replay attack

Results of mitigation against a replay attack are shown in Figure 7.6(b).
Before an attack happens, the system is operating at the steady state. At k=70s, the replay attack
starts to send the historical data of T2 to the controller. To keep the attack stealthy, the replayed
data is in the same steady state at the beginning of this attack. At k=80s, the historical data
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starts to change the setpoint of T2 from 30 ℃ to 25 ℃. Since the controller regulates the system
based on the replayed data, which causes the continued increase of the actual temperature T2 .
The detection system raises an alarm at k=88s.
The attack-resilient control system starts operation at k=121s, the estimated Tˆ2 (k ) is used by
the controller. Results have shown that the proposed attack defensive strategies can bring the
system back to its steady state from k=147s onward.
Under the case of the replay attack, when the measured T2 is replayed by the attacker, the
detection scheme arises an alarm and the attacked data is replaced. Since the estimated value
of T̂2 has deviated from the setpoint 30℃, the decision scheme switches the control objective
to maintain the system in a safe state.
Results in Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6 have demonstrated that the proposed framework is
effective to defend against stealthy attacks on sensor data. When an anomaly is detected, the
corrupted data is replaced by its estimated values, the decision-making logic will respond to
these anomalies and select the most appropriate control algorithm, and the resilient control
scheme can recover the system characteristics and return it to the normal operating conditions.
Because the resilient control requires system reconfiguration when responding to attacks, it is
often required an operator’s confirmation for safety-critical processes, instead of automatically
react to the attack. Hence, although the proposed mitigation methods can maintain the system
in a safe state, it is considered to be a temporary solution at the best. Human operator will make
the final decision.

7.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, an attack defensive framework and an attack-resilient control scheme are
proposed to mitigate impacts of insider attacks. The overall framework provides a defense-indepth defense approach against the studied attacks. The resilient control scheme consists of an
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attack response scheme, a decision-making logic and a set of controllers. The attack response
isolates the tampered measurements and replaces them by estimated or reconstructed values.
The decision-making logic responds to the anomalies identified by the detection scheme and
subsequently triggers the desirable control modes. Corresponding controllers are then switched
to mitigate the attacks and maintain the safety of the system.
Results have shown that the proposed framework is effective to defend against insider attacks
on sensors. This multi-layered defensive framework addresses the security enhancement
strategies including attack prevention, detection, response and mitigation, which provide a
defense-in-depth protection against insider attacks. The attack-resilient control system
integrates the security and safety solutions together, to mitigate attack impacts and maintain
the system in a safe state effectively.
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Chapter 8

8

Conclusions and Future Work

8.1 Conclusions
The research reported in this dissertation is comprised of theoretical study and experimental
evaluation of an attack-resilient control system design, analysis and demonstration. The
contributions of this work can be summarized as follows.

8.1.1 Theoretical analysis and design
(1) Security of cyber-physical systems has been investigated and related issues are analyzed.
This work presents the existing research work related to insider attacks. Vulnerabilities of
systems are analyzed to determine potential ways for security enhancements. Existing security
solutions, including attack prevention, attack detection and attack mitigation strategies are
investigated.
System vulnerabilities are important factors for the security enhancement solutions, and from
the existing security solutions, some insights can be extracted to strength the system security
situation.
(2) A methodology to analyze features of potential insider attacks and their impacts has been
proposed.
The methodology is based on system-theoretic and graph-theoretic approaches. Firstly,
vulnerability analysis related to insider attacks are analyzed for a general cyber-physical
system. Then, an attack pattern is described for such attacks, which includes attack goals,
resources, constraints, modes, as well as possible attack paths. Stealthy conditions are analyzed
in temporal and spatial dimensions, potential impacts of such attacks on the system are
analyzed using an attack tree. Similarities among different cyber-physical attack scenarios and
system vulnerabilities have also been examined.
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This methodology links the attack impacts with system vulnerabilities, which provides insights
into design of security enhancement strategies. Analysis results of the stealthy conditions
demonstrate that the limits of insider attacks, and the stealthy condition can also be used as an
indicator for attack detection schemes.
(3) An online cross-layer detection scheme has been developed with respect to stealthy insider
attacks.
The detection scheme takes on a hierarchical approach by using different detection methods in
different layers to provide a defense-in-depth detection against the attacks. A model-based
detection method and a data-driven detection method are employed to detect various anomalies.
A cross-layer design provides detections from a cyber layer to a physical process. In this
detection scheme, data-driven and model-based detection methods cooperate to reveal the
stealthiness of attacks. This methodology has been proven to be effective in detecting both
spatial stealthy attacks and temporal attacks.
(4) An attack defensive framework and an attack-resilient control scheme have been proposed.
To make the system resilient to various insider attacks, a multi-layered defensive framework
is presented. The framework includes attack prevention, detection, response and mitigation.
To mitigate the impacts of attacks, an attack-resilient control scheme is provided, in which a
decision-making scheme is designed to make decisions under various threats, and select a
suitable attack-resilient controller to mitigate the impacts of attacks.
The defense-in-depth deployment of the attack-resilient control structure provides layered
protection for the system. The attack-resilient control system can ensure that the safety-critical
physical process remains in the safe state in case of attacks.
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8.1.2 Experimental validation and evaluation
(1) A design guideline on how to develop a security platform on a cyber-physical system has
been developed, and a modular approach to design such a platform has been proposed for
security assessment of cyber-physical systems.
The developed platform consists of three functional modules: (1) Attack Scenario Generation
Module, (2) Security Enhancement Module, and (3) Security Evaluation Module. The first
module can be used to synthesize attack scenarios to identify system vulnerabilities. The
second module provides various strategies to prevent, detect and mitigate attacks. The third
module creates a multi-layer systematic environment to analyze and evaluate cyber-physical
security issues.
The generalized methodology provides a guideline to develop a security assessment platform.
Modular design makes the development and implementation flexible. In addition, this platform
proposes a cross-layer framework, it supports not only cyber-physical security assessment but
also security enhancement, which makes a diverse and defense-in-depth security study possible.
(2) A prototype platform has been designed and implemented.
A prototype platform has been implemented by using a physical component based dynamic
system simulator, known as nuclear process control test facility (NPCTF). To demonstrate the
effectiveness of the proposed platform, case studies have been carried out on the proposed
platform to demonstrate how to perform different security tests for vulnerability assessment
and security enhancement. Different security scenarios have been designed and evaluated on
this platform, which bridges a gap between academic research and engineering applications.
The prototype platform can be extended to other cyber-physical systems. Due to the modular
design, the proposed generalized modular design is not restricted only to NPCTF, it can be
used with other cyber-physical systems with appropriate configurations.
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8.2 Limitations of this work
Considering the scope and assumptions of this work, there are a few limitations in the current
work.
(1) The studied attacks are insider attacks on tampering on sensor data or control signals.
Detection of these kinds of attacks are based on the safety limits of the system, and the data
in cyber domain are extracted from the data base in the supervisory station. If the safety
limits of the system have been manipulated, the detection scheme and mitigation scheme
would have been misled and lead up to wrong decisions. If the database is attacked, the
detection and mitigation schemes might be deceived as well. Therefore, it is of importance
to secure the safety limits and data base in the supervisory station.
(2) Since the work is focused on attacks a in a single communication channel at a time, when
multiple sensors are being tampered, the closed loop control might be interrupted into an
open loop control, the attacker might tamper with the data arbitrarily and/ or launch
coordinated attacks to bypass or hide their malicious actions. In such situations, the
detection and mitigation schemes might not be effective anymore. Therefore, study the
number of sensor attacks that can be detected by the proposed system is necessary in the
future work.
(3) The purpose of this work is to design an attack-resilient control system against the insider
cyber-physical attacks on sensor data and control commands. Detection and mitigation
schemes are deployed in supervisory station. It is assumed that the supervisory layer is
isolated from rest of the system and is secure with respect to the studied attacks. If the
supervisory station is attacked, the attacker might get control of the whole system and
arbitrarily change the system configuration. All the data that are received and sent over the
communication channel can be obtained and modified by the attacker, the proposed work
might not work anymore.
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8.3 Future work
Security of cyber-physical systems is an emerging area of research. While the current work
presents multiple contributions, continued efforts are still needed. Based on the work so far,
future research can be directed to the following topics:
(1) Security analysis

An attack-defense tree could be used to analyze the security situation of system based on gametheoretic tools.
(2) Anomaly detection scheme


For detection methods that are based on state estimation, credibility of the observed
measurement data and the estimated data could be evaluated, to improve the detection rate
and false alarms.



Machine learning techniques can be considered for anomaly detection to online predict
the system output or classify the system patterns using measurement data.

(3) Resilient control of cyber-physical systems


Security control of communication protocols and attack-resilient control of physical
process should be integrated to provide a more effective solution against insider attacks.



To further enhance the ability against stealthy attacks, online cross-layered detection and
supervised resilient control techniques should be considered together. A flexible
reconfiguration structure is needed to accommodate this research.



After the detection scheme triggers an alarm, it is important to have techniques to isolate
and reconstruct the tampered data to ensure the safety operation of the system. More
research is needed in this area.
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Redundant communication and measurement channels can be used for safety-critical
variables. More research is needed in this area.

(4) Security platform

The designed prototype platform can be extended to other applications, such as study on attack
penetration tests, online reconfiguration of defense strategies, and synthesis of control
strategies.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Code packages*.

*

No.

File Name

A1.1

Attack HMI

A1.2

Attack scripts

A1.3

Activation switch

A1.4

ABB AC700F DCS program
configuration

A1.5

Defense programs

A1.6

Snort environment settings

Files
Attack HMI design codes
Attack data processing codes
UWO Security test interface
Communication protocol parsing codes
Attack data processing code package
Trigger logic design
Attack scripts for attack scenarios in the dissertation
Activation switch PCB design and configuration
Activation switch configuration codes
OPC interface design
Anomaly detection HMI design
Mitigation reconfiguration program
OPC communication codes
Data collection and processing codes
Detection codes for different detection methods
Mitigation codes
Results demonstration codes
Snort rules

Considering the security of the designed platform and security of NPCTF, the developed
code is not publicized. Please contact UWO CIE Lab for more information if necessary.
Appendix B: Demo videos.
No.
B1.1
B1.2

Video Name
Demo for security
platform design
Demo for security tests

Links
http://cies‐western‐eng.ca/xirong/file1.mp4
http://cies‐western‐eng.ca/xirong/file2.mp4
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